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THESIS

THE U.S. MARITIME STRATEGY IN THE
NORTH ATLANTIC AND THE NORWEGIAN
SEA: AN EVOLVING STRATEGY IN
NEED OF REASSESSMENT

by

Jimmy Clifford Woodard

June 1991

Thesis Advisor: Dr. Rodney Kennedy-Minott

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THE U.S. MARITIME STRATEGY IN THE NORTH ATLANTIC AND
NORWEGIAN SEA: AN EVOLVING STRATEGY IN NEED OF REASSESSMENT

by

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Submitted in partial fulfillment of the
requirements for the degree of

MASTER OF ARTS IN NATIONAL SECURITY AFFAIRS


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
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ABSTRACT

This thesis examines the evolution, and theoretical basis of the United States' maritime strategy in the North Atlantic and what is referred to as "NATO's Northern Flank." The strategy associated with past Secretary of the Navy, John Lehman, is no longer considered applicable in the context of today's East-West relationship and is in need of reassessment. The paper then assesses the current, post Cold War situation and looks at future security interests the United States may have in the region. Additionally, the security and defense capabilities of our allies in the region are examined. Given the United States will remain closely linked with European security issues, by examining the successes and failures of past strategies and the strengths and weaknesses of our allies, one will be better able to develop a new strategy.



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TABLE OF CONTENTS

	Page
I. INTRODUCTION.....	1
A. PURPOSE.....	1
B. BACKGROUND.....	2
II. POST WORLD WAR TWO GEO-POLITICAL DEVELOPMENTS ON	
NATO'S NORTHERN FLANK	8
A. BACKGROUND.....	8
B. SOVIET-SCANDINAVIAN COLD WAR POLICY.....	9
1. SOVIET-FINNISH POLICY.....	9
2. SOVIET - SWEDISH POLICY.....	13
3. SOVIET POLICY TOWARD THE SCANDINAVIAN MEMBERS	
OF NATO	19
C. THE FUTURE FOR SOVIET-SCANDINAVIAN RELATIONS....	27
III. THE POST WORLD WAR II U.S. MARITIME STRATEGY.....	33
A. THE AMERICAN MARITIME STRATEGY: 1945-1976.....	35
B. THE BUILDUP OF THE SOVIET NAVY IN THE POST-WAR	
PERIOD	45
C. THE U.S. MARITIME STRATEGY: 1976-1989.....	54
D. SUMMARY.....	74
IV. THE NORTH ATLANTIC MARITIME STRATEGY AFTER THE COLD	
WAR.....	76
A. THE END OF THE COLD WAR.....	76
B. UNITED STATES MILITARY STRATEGY FOR THE 1990S....	80

C. U.S. NAVAL STRATEGY FOR THE 1990S.....	86
D. EUROPE'S ROLE IN THE NEW STRATEGY.....	89
E. THE UNCERTAIN FUTURE OF SCANDINAVIA'S ABILITY TO CONTRIBUTE TO ITS DEFENSE.....	96
F. OTHER CURRENT ISSUES THAT MIGHT EFFECT NORDIC-U.S.- U.S.S.R. RELATIONS.....	110
V. CONCLUSION.....	114
BIBLIOGRAPHY.....	118
INITIAL DISTRIBUTION LIST.....	122

I. INTRODUCTION

A. PURPOSE

This study examines the history, theoretical evolution and future security requirements of the United States' maritime strategy in the North Atlantic and what is referred to as "NATO's Northern Flank."¹ (see Figure: 1) The strategy associated with past Secretary of the Navy, John Lehman, is no longer considered applicable in the context of today's East-West relationship and is in need of reassessment.² The paper then looks at current and future security interests the United States may have in the region and what past lessons, if any, can be applied to a new strategy.

¹For purposes of this thesis, "NATO's Northern Flank" will be the Scandinavian countries of Denmark, Finland, Iceland, Norway, and Sweden. Although Finland and Sweden are not members of the Alliance, their political and military posture is important to Western security interest.

²Carlisle A.H. Trost, "Maritime Strategy for the 1990s, United States Naval Institute Proceedings (hereafter referred to as Proceedings) (Naval Review 1990), p. 92.

B. BACKGROUND

The middle 1970s through the early 1980s saw a renaissance in United States military and strategic thinking. This was in response to five major factors: the post-Vietnam era with its declining naval force structure; perceived Soviet expansionism into what once had been areas of Western European and American interest; increasing global Soviet naval presence; domestic and international questioning of American strength and resolve; and a period of declining budgets for defense acquisitions under the Nixon and the Carter administrations. Spearheaded by influential leaders within the Department of the Navy, and based in part on the philosophical foundations of Alfred Thayer Mahan's masterwork, *The Influence of Sea Power upon History, 1660-1783*, the strategic concept that became known as the "Maritime Strategy" was developed and implemented.³ This concept served as a guide for U.S. naval operations

³By the late-1980s, the term "Maritime Strategy" fell into disuse in politico-military circles as the Navy began stressing the joint military requirements of a National Strategy. The preferred terminology became "the maritime component of the National Military Strategy" as coined by then Chief of Naval Operations Admiral James D. Watkins, in the Supplement to U.S. Naval Institute Proceedings (hereinafter cited as Proceedings), January 1986, pp. 2-17. The term "Maritime Strategy" has several pseudonyms: the Forward Maritime Strategy [FMS], and "the maritime component of the National Military Strategy".

worldwide from 1983 until the end of the decade.⁴ The Navy did not formulate this strategy in isolation; it had to confer closely with its allies to ensure success. Given however that the U.S. Navy is the largest component element of Western naval power, the Maritime Strategy has had a profound impact on operations and policy in these countries, especially the Nordic members of NATO and Great Britain.⁵

Since the Reagan presidency the world has witnessed enormous changes. The old bi-polar alignment of the United States against the Soviet Union has faded and Mikhail Gorbachev's *Glasnost* and *Perestroika* seem to be the long sought after turn around of domestic and international

⁴A tremendous amount of literature exist on the formulation of the "Maritime Strategy". Probably the best listing of the professional debates that occurred is Captain Peter M. Swartz's "Contemporary U.S. Naval Strategy: A Bibliography," Supplement to U.S. Naval Institute Proceedings, pp. 41-7, and his "1986 Addendum" in the same journal, January 1986.

⁵For an analysis of the impact of the Maritime Strategy on the Far North see Rodney Kennedy-Minott, U.S. Regional Force Application: The Maritime Strategy and Its Effect on Nordic Stability (Hoover Institute: Stanford University, 1988), 1-49.; John C. Ausland, Nordic Security and the Great Powers (Bolder, CO: Westview Press, 1986); Eric Grove, ed. NATO's Defense of the North (London: Brassey's, 1988); and Ola Tunander, Cold Water Politics (London: SAGE Publications, 1989). NATO's three major military commands (Tri-MNC), Europe (SACEUR), Atlantic (SACLANT), and English Channel (CINCCAN) developed a concept of Maritime operations in the 1980s (Tri-MNC CONMAROPS), that is closely patterned after the Lehman strategy and is the plan NATO would use in the event of crisis or hostilities.

Soviet policy. The Western world celebrated as one Soviet satellite after another forsake Communism and declared interest in the tenets of Capitalism. The Warsaw Pact Treaty Organization (WPTO) disintegrated before the eyes of the world. After living with the Cold War for over forty years, the West eagerly embraced this beginning of a new spirit of cooperation between the superpowers. The alliance of Western powers, especially the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO), seems to have performed the function for which it was founded, i.e. to prevent Soviet expansion and domination, especially in Western Europe. NATO member countries have begun to question the need for maintaining strong defenses and are eagerly awaiting the "peace dividend." There appears to be a period of inward searching on both sides of the Atlantic. American and European politicians, no longer feeling the threat of Soviet adventurism, have announced reduced spending on defense and a shift of national efforts to domestic problems. President Bush, in a speech given at the Aspen Institute Symposium on 2 August 1990, called for a twenty five percent cut in U.S. defense forces by 1995.⁶ The U.S. Joint Chiefs of Staff

⁶New York Times, 3 August 1990, p. A13(W) and The Washington Times, 3 August 1990, p. A7. It is unfortunate that this speech did not receive much attention at the time, but on the same date of President Bush's speech Iraq's

(JCS) have begun planning for regional conflicts and a reconstitution policy that can deal with a resurgent Soviet military, if necessary.⁷

Critics of the policy have questioned the West's ability to reconstitute its high technology systems such as submarines, aircraft and modern warships and that perhaps such a policy is premature.⁸ The Soviet military appears unwilling to surrender their power base, threatening recent achievements in arms control.⁹ [New York Times, 6 February 1991, p. A1.] The turmoil in the Baltic States has resulted in questioning who is truly in charge in the Soviet Union:

forces invaded the tiny nation of Kuwait, thus drawing international attention to events in the Persian Gulf for the next seven months.

⁷See: Joint Chiefs of Staff, 1991 Joint Military Net Assessment (JMNA), (Pentagon: Office of Public Information). The "Reconstitution Strategy" as the proposed policy is known was discussed at some length during the Cook Conference (CINCs Planning Conference) held at the Naval Postgraduate School, 5-7 March 1991. The strategy envisions four forces: strategic nuclear force that is increasing sea-based and modernized; an Atlantic force that is a heavy force, principally land oriented to respond to high intensity conflicts in Europe, Africa, and S.W. Asia; a Pacific force that is principally a maritime force; and a Contingency force that is a tailored mix of mobile, flexible forces (AF, USN & Army) designed to respond to unexpected and unpredicted future crisis.

⁸James J. Tritten, "America's New National Security Strategy," Submarine Review (April 1991), pp. 15-24.

⁹Michael R. Gordon, "Outlook is Cloudy for Arms Deal by U.S. and Soviets," New York Times, 6 February 1991, p. A1(W).

the politicians or the military. Can the strife there threaten the stability of the rest of Europe and can the U.S. Navy plan accordingly?

The position the United States Navy finds itself in today is very much like that of the mid-1970s. Although not in the post-Vietnam soul searching mode, the call for reduced military expenditures and reductions in manpower, while maintaining global commitments, seems to be a case of deja vu. The time is now for the Navy to seize the initiative and plan for the next decade and beyond and, in the process, define its mission within the context of a national strategy. The revival of strategic maritime thinking that is synonymous with the formulation of the "Lehman Maritime Strategy" should not be allowed to fall into neglect. The philosophical underpinnings of the strategy are by design flexible enough to allow for global change and incorporation into a joint defense policy that meets the goals set by the President, Congress, and the American people.

To ensure such planning is comprehensive and based on sound judgement, the naval strategist must have a firm foundation regarding the geostrategic importance of the Nordic countries to U.S. security policy. The following chapter will briefly acquaint the reader with 20th century U.S.-Soviet-Nordic relations.




FIGURE 1: NATO'S NORTHERN FLANK AS VIEWED FROM MOSCOW.

(Source: Eric Grove, ed., NATO's Defense of the North (Brassey's Atlantic Commentaries No. 1 (London: Brassey's (UK) Ltd., 1989), vii.)

II. POST WORLD WAR TWO GEO-POLITICAL DEVELOPMENTS ON NATO'S NORTHERN FLANK

A. BACKGROUND

As noted in the introduction, the Soviet Union has undergone a tremendous amount of change since 1986. President Gorbachev's sweeping reforms and era of openness, *Glasnost*, have decreased tensions between the Superpowers. The events in Eastern Europe since November 1989, have been phenomenal. No one would have predicted that the Soviet Union would release its satellite states so quickly and without bloodshed. Europeans are beginning to believe that the fear of a super power confrontation they have lived with since the end of the Second World War is now a thing of the past.

Nowhere is this more welcomed perhaps, than in the Scandinavian countries where due to geography, they have been caught between the struggles of the superpowers. This has led to unique relations with both superpowers following World War II. To envision the future, one must first have a sound understanding of the geo-political developments in the region. This knowledge combined with ongoing events in the Soviet Union, Europe, and the United States will be major factors for developing of a "Northern Flank" for the future.

B. SOVIET-SCANDINAVIAN COLD WAR POLICY

1. Soviet-Finnish Policy

The end of the Second World War found Finland in a unique and disadvantaged situation compared to the other Scandinavian countries. It first fought on the side of the Axis powers in retaliation for the Soviet- Finnish Winter War of 1940. Then, under the terms of the truce signed in 1944, Finland decisively turned against the Nazis and routed them from the country. It is probably this quick action against their former allies that saved Finns from the fate of the other Soviet occupied countries of Europe; they were the only former German ally in Europe to escape occupation by the Allies. Also, of all the Soviet Union's World War II foes, Helsinki was the only European enemy capital the Red Army failed to capture.

The terms of the truce and the peace treaty that followed required Finland to:

...recognize the treaty of 1940. The Porkkala area, 380 square kilometers to the southwest of Helsinki, was to be leased to Soviet Union for fifty years. Petsamo in the north would be turned over to the U.S.S.R. Finland's armed forces were to be radically limited and \$300 million were to be paid in war reparations. Finland agreed to cooperate with the Allies (in effect the Soviet Union) in detaining and sentencing persons

guilty of war crimes and in breaking up all organizations of a "fascist nature."¹⁰

The stubborn Finnish government, although still independent, was almost absorbed into the Soviet Empire. Evidence of this comes from records of the second truce meeting held between Molotov and the Finnish prime minister, Hachzell in May 1944.¹¹ Milovan Djilas, the well know Yugoslav communist, who later fell out of favor with the Party, reports that Stalin remembered that less than four million Finns inflicted one million casualties on the Soviets form 1939-1941, and had a healthy respect for the Finns.¹² Under Soviet leadership an Allied Control Commission was set up to oversee the truce. This allowed the Soviets to monitor closely the political path chosen by the Finnish government.

The bravery shown during the Winter War and the postwar unity of the Finnish government and people ultimately won the day. The Finnish people freely elected a

¹⁰Orjan Berner, Soviet Policies Toward the Nordic Countries (Lanham, Md.: Center for International Affairs, Harvard University, University Press of America, 1986), pp. 36-37.

¹¹Ibid, p. 36.

¹²Milovan Djilas, Conversations with Stalin (San Diego: Harcourt Brace Jovanovich, Publishers, 1962), p. 155.

new political leadership, headed by J. K. Paasikivi. Its relationship at that point with the Soviets can best be described as cautious and pragmatic -- as would be expected when dealing from an inferior position. A final peace agreement was signed between the Soviet Union and Finland in 1947 at Paris. The treaty was "...accompanied by a series of good-will gestures, including passage of Finnish trains through the Porkkala area, albeit with the windows closed."¹³

The Soviet-Finnish Pact of Friendship, Cooperation, and Mutual Assistance (FCMA), negotiated in the Summer of 1948, defined the framework for Soviet-Finnish relations that has existed to the present. It is interesting to note that the Finns drafted the treaty, not the Soviets.

In time was born the term, *Finlandization*, which to the western political mind means any "neutral nation" that is sympathetic to Moscow of necessity. The independent Finns however dislike the term, feeling that it denotes submission to Soviet demands.¹⁴

¹³Berner, p. 42.

¹⁴Kennedy-Minott, p. 37. Ambassador Minott served as the United States Ambassador to Sweden during the Carter administration and his work gives a good overview of U.S.-Scandinavian relations from the post-war period through the mid-1980s. "Finlandization" is thought to be a term of

From the early 1950s until the Brezhnev era, Finland was in the middle of many East-West political confrontations. For example, when West Germany joined NATO in 1954-55, Moscow exerted considerable pressure on Finland to promote the Soviet alternative of an all-European collective security system. (Not the last time the Soviets promoted this idea.)

In 1957, in order to dramatize his policy of "peaceful coexistence," Soviet Premier Khrushchev returned to Finland the area of Porkkala and extended the FCMA treaty for 20 years. Soviet naval power moved from the Gulf of Finland to Murmansk and the southern Baltic during this period, signaling a shift in Moscow's strategic interest toward the Kola Peninsula and the open waters of the North Atlantic.¹⁵

The Berlin crisis in the fall of 1961, put the FCMA treaty to the acid test:

...Khrushchev proposed to Finnish President Urho Kekkonen that they consult under the treaty. Kekkonen was at the time on an official visit to the U.S., in fact in Hawaii. After returning to Finland, he visited Khrushchev and talked him out of formal consultations.¹⁶

contempt originated by the late conservative West German political leader, Franz Josef Strauss.

¹⁵Berner, p. 82.

After the Berlin crisis and the U.S.-Soviet standoff over the "Missiles of October" in 1962, Soviet foreign policy interest shifted from Europe. Presumably, the perception was that the situation in Berlin had reached a status quo and any attempt to shift the balance was considered too volatile an issue to pursue.¹⁷ Moscow looked to the fertile grounds of the Third World in which to spread its influence. This helped relieve the pressure on the Nordic countries and the Baltic. The relationship between the Finland and the Soviet Union has remained one of relaxed stability and mutual benefit to both parties through the present.

2. Soviet - Swedish Policy

The Soviet - Swedish relationship since the end of the Second World War can be described as one of respect for Swedish neutrality, inter-mixed with periods of heightened

¹⁶John C. Ausland, Nordic Security and the Great Powers (Bolder, CO.: Westview Press, 1986), p. 142. Kekkonen handled the "Note Crisis" well. The Swedes were quite anxious over events as they unfolded. Kekkonen took a leisurely ship cruise home to Finland, allowing the situation to defuse.

¹⁷Gordon A. Craig and Alexander L. George, Force and Statecraft (New York and Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1983), pp. 124-5.

tensions caused mainly by provocative Soviet military intrusions into Swedish territorial airspace and waters.¹⁸ The Soviets have viewed the Swedes as a vital western trading partner, underscored by the fact that Sweden was the first Western nation to accept officially Soviet gold for trade payment.¹⁹

Nevertheless, Sweden's capitalistic nature, self-proclaimed neutrality, and pro-western, socialistic government were reasons enough for Stalin and Molotov to feel that Sweden was in the Western "camp" after the war. (The sale of iron ore to and providing rail transportation for the Nazis during the war did not help matters.) The Soviet press, immediately after the war, condemned this cooperation and pushed for a more sympathetic stance toward Moscow.²⁰ By 1946 however, this Soviet criticism had

¹⁸Swedish neutrality has worked to the advantage of both the United States and the Soviet Union. Has long as Sweden maintained a strong defense force, the United States (and Norway) did not have to devote resources to defend the area. The Soviets benefited because Sweden's stated neutrality served as a buffer much like Finland. See: Ola Tunander, Cold Water Politics (London, Newbury Park and New Delhi: SAGE Publications, and International Peace Research Institute, Oslo, 1989), p. 11.

¹⁹Mikhail Heller and Aleksandr M. Nekrich, Utopia in Power: The History of the Soviet Union From 1917 to the Present, trans. Phyllis B. Carlos (New York: Summit Books, 1986), p. 122.

²⁰Berner, p. 53.

diminished. Ironically, the Swedish press took a progressively hostile view toward the Soviet Union at this time.²¹ These journalistic exchanges set the tone for Soviet-Swedish relations for the next forty years; a cyclic media battle.

The late 1940s to early 1950s, witnessed strained Soviet-Swedish relations. Sweden supported Western condemnation in the U.N. of Communist aggression in Korea. *Bolshevik*, the Soviet's theoretical mouthpiece, published an article in April 1951, entitled "Sweden's Rightist Social Democrats--the Lackeys of American Imperialism." This article roundly condemned the pro-western, capitalist government of the Swedes for giving aid to U.N. forces fighting in Korea and participation in trade embargoes against the Eastern Bloc countries. Some firms, such as SKF, followed COCOM guidelines and claimed to Eastern European customers that their production capacity was fully booked.²²

Another source of friction between the two governments during this period was the mysterious disappearance of the Swedish diplomat Raoul Wallenberg while

²¹Ibid, pp. 53-4.

²²Ibid, p. 79.

assisting Hungarian Jews. He was arrested in Budapest in 1945 and charged with spying by the Soviets. His whereabouts remained unknown until 1957, when The Soviets admitted that he had died in the Gulags in 1947.²³

The height of Swedish-Soviet tensions in the early postwar period came in mid-June of 1952, during the so called "Catallina affair". The Soviets shot down two Swedish reconnaissance planes over international waters in the Baltic. The Swedes claimed that the two aircraft were on peaceful missions in international airspace. The Soviets claim that the first Catallina, with a crew of eight, was on an electronic spying mission for NATO. Additionally, they claimed the two aircraft were in Soviet airspace and opened fire when the intercepting aircraft tried to force them to land.²⁴ Whether the downing of these aircraft occurred over international airspace or not, it served notice to the small Nordic nations that military (or civilian) flights too close to sensitive Soviet installations would be dealt with quickly and severely.

By the mid-50s, the East-West "thaw" affected Soviet relations with Sweden as well as the rest of the

²³Ibid, p. 80.

²⁴Berner, p. 80-81.

world.²⁵ Moscow continued to insist that a neutral policy "be active and contribute through political initiatives to the peaceful solution of international problems;"²⁶ it remained suspicious of Swedish neutrality and felt that the size of the Swedish armed forces was too large for the defensive purpose of a small nation. The Swedes replied that such force was necessary to maintain their neutrality.

The most damaging incidents to Soviet-Swedish relations in recent years have been the Soviet submarine incursions into Swedish territorial waters. According to scholar and author, Ola Tunander, these can be divided into five distinct periods since the 1950s and have sometimes resulted in serious diplomatic strains.²⁷ By 1982, the

²⁵The 1954 Geneva Agreement, negotiated by the superpowers on behalf of the French and the Vietminh, settled the Indo-China War by dividing the country along the 17th parallel. The cooperation between the two superpowers was viewed, at least briefly, as a thaw in the Cold War. See: David K. Hall, "The Laos Neutralization Agreement, 1962," in U.S.-Soviet Security Cooperation, Alexander George, Philip J. Farley, and Alexander Dallin, (New York and Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1988), pp. 435-6.

²⁶Berner, 83. The Soviet was able to use "neutrality" to its political advantage in the Third World. If these Third World countries were "non-aligned," then they were not part of the Western camp and could possibly "persuaded" to side with Moscow on important international issues.

²⁷Ola Tunander, "Gray Zone or Buffer Zone: the Nordic Borderland and the Soviet Union", Nordic Journal of Soviet and East European Studies, Vol. 4:4 (1987), p. 16.

number of sighting increased to around 40 including reported mini-sub and robot submarines. The most famous incidents were the "Whiskey on the Rocks" affair in October 1981, and the "Horsfjaerden incident" in the summer of 1982.²⁸ Although a series of accusations and counter-accusations followed in both the Swedish and Soviet press, both sides were careful not to cut off diplomatic ties. The Soviets do not appear to have learned from the 1982 incident. Reports of sightings continued as late as 1989.²⁹

The early 1980s witnessed the deployment of Ground Launched Cruise Missiles (GLCMs) and Pershing IIs in Western Europe and of Tomahawk Sea Launched Cruise Missiles (SLCMs) aboard U.S. Navy vessels. The Soviet military buildup on the Kola since the mid-1950s had made the peninsula a high priority target area for Western military planners. In an East-West confrontation, any Western launches from the southern Norwegian Sea to the Kola or any Soviet cruise missiles launched from the Kola to Western Europe would have to transit Swedish airspace. The Swedes take this violation

²⁸Berner, 150, and Jan Breemer, Soviets Submarines: Design, Development and Tactics (Coulsdon, Surry (UK): Jane's Information Group, 1989), p. 158.

²⁹Rodger Magnergard, "Foreign Submarine in the Inner Archipelago for Over a Week," Svenska Dagbladet, 5 February 1989, p. 6, trans. FBIS-WEU-89-028, 13 February 1989, p. 17.

of their sovereignty seriously and practice shooting down cruise missiles in their exercises.³⁰

3. Soviet Policy Toward the Scandinavian Members of NATO

Norway, Denmark, and Iceland comprise the Nordic members of NATO. In 1948, Sweden, Denmark and Norway discussed the formation of a Nordic security league but were not successful in this endeavor.³¹ Fear of Soviet expansionism in the late 1940s brought Norway, Denmark, and Iceland into the NATO fold. That this should happen could not have been a complete surprise to the Russians. According to Berner, throughout the war "[t]he Soviets saw Norway and Denmark . . . as an area of British-American military responsibility."³² Norway and Denmark were liberated by the Western allies, although the Red Army briefly occupied the northern Norwegian county of Finnmark

³⁰Tunander, "Gray Zone," p. 14. This is not a new issue. U.S. and Soviet strategic bomber forces would have to cross Swedish airspace on their polar routes to get to their targets.

³¹William J. Taylor, Jr. and Paul M. Cole, ed., Nordic Defense: Comparative Decision Making (Lexington, MA: Lexington Books, D.C. Heath and Company, 1985), pp. 1 and 114.

³²Berner, p. 57.

and the Danish island of Bornholm.³³ Iceland, a former Danish colony, had been occupied by the British in 1940 and the U.S. in 1941. As the Cold War developed and intensified, these countries had the misfortune of sitting astride potential Soviet lines of interdiction into the Atlantic, and accordingly hold great strategic value for both the East and West.

The Danish-Soviet relationship has, for the most part, been a correct and stable one. Tensions have been occurred at times, notably in 1962, when the Danes and the West Germans formed a joint military command, "BALTAP," (Baltic Approaches). As might be expected, the Soviets objected to the joint command structure and sent a strongly worded "note" to Copenhagen calling the plan "measures which complicate the situation in the Baltic area and concern the security interest of other Baltic States."³⁴ Another bone of contention has been the use of Danish airfields by NATO aircraft involved electronic surveillance of Warsaw Pact operations. The Danes have sought to reassure Moscow by not allowing the stationing of foreign troops or nuclear weapons

³³Kennedy-Minott, pp. 2 and 40; and Berner, pp. 53-54.

³⁴Berner, p. 86; and Christian Thune and Nikolaj Peterson, "Denmark," in Taylor and Cole, p. 3.

on their soil during peacetime.³⁵ Their hedging on the "Euro-missile" question in the late 1970s raised questions among the alliance partners of how Denmark would respond to an East- West crisis.

Iceland, a charter member of NATO, has had a love-hate relationship with the Alliance³⁶. Iceland's military capabilities are limited to a coast guard fleet used mainly for fisheries protection. Its main Allied contribution under several bilateral treaties is to provide basing rights for NATO forces in the strategic approaches to the North Atlantic and the Norwegian Sea. As noted earlier, Iceland was occupied by Allied troops during WWII. Although Icelanders were mostly sympathetic to the Allied cause, the fact that the British showed up uninvited in the spring of 1940 with an occupation force did not sit well with Icelandic independence-minded attitudes. Iceland was trying to rid itself of its colonial master, Denmark. U.S. Marines relieved part of the British forces one year later. (Of

³⁵Berner, pp. 86-88. Moscow sent a "note" in 1961 warning Denmark that if nuclear weapons were stored in country, Denmark would become a nuclear target.

³⁶For an excellent overview of Iceland's relationship with the United States and NATO refer to: Albert Jonsson, Iceland, NATO, and the Keflavik Base, (Reykjavik: The Icelandic Commission on Security and International Affairs, 1989); and Kennedy-Minott, pp. 19-24.

note, Marines were defending Iceland before the Japanese attack at Pearl Harbor.) Icelanders are fiercely protective of their culture and heritage which dates from settlement by Irish monks in the 6th to 9th centuries. The cultural shock introduced by these occupying forces caused considerable disruption. These effects are still felt today and are consistently brought up when basing rights or expanding military presence are brought up for discussion in the *Althing* (Parliament).

U.S. and British troops were withdrawn from Iceland at war's end, but the U.S. retained authorization for use of the air base at Keflavik. As the Cold War began in the late 1940s, the pro-Western Icelandic government reconsidered its non-allied stance and invited U.S. troops to return.

Under the 1951 agreement with the United States, manning of the NATO facility at Keflavik and at the radar and communications stations is limited to approximately 3,100 military personnel with dependents.³⁷ The Soviets applied diplomatic pressure on the Icelandic government, conveying veiled threats concerning its involvement in

³⁷Kennedy-Minott, p. 20. "The 1951 agreement was described by the Russians as 'making Iceland virtually a military base of the U.S.A.," from Berner, p. 71.

Western politics. In the mid-1950s a communist majority was elected to power. The Althing called for removal of American troops from Iceland, but the Soviet invasion of Hungary a couple of months later, contributed to the government's fall from power and the signature of a base agreement with the United States.³⁸

The Norwegian-Soviet relationship is more complex. Norway's northernmost county, Finnmark, shares a common border with the Soviet Union (and, as noted above, was occupied briefly after the Second World War by the Soviets). Additionally, the Soviets and the Norwegians have a series of pre-war bilateral agreements to work out. Under a Versailles Treaty mandate, the Norwegians received control of Svalbard (Spitzbergen)³⁹. In 1944, Soviet Foreign Minister Molotov tried to persuade the Norwegian government in exile to agree to a shared responsibility for the archipelago, including Bear Island. Such an agreement would have placed the Soviets in a significant geographic advantage for protecting its Northern Flank in the post-war period. Under pressure from the British, who recognized the

³⁸Ibid.

³⁹William L. Langer, ed., An Encyclopedia of World History, 5th ed. (Boston: Houghton Mifflin Co., 1980), p. 1044.

importance of the island group, the Norwegians refused. The Soviets, as signatories to the 1922 Spitzbergen Treaty, were permitted to conduct mining and scientific activities; the Soviets expanded these endeavors, knowing that the Norwegians could not really do more than protest. Under the treaty however, neither side can establish naval bases or permanent fortifications there.⁴⁰

Another issue pre-dating World War II is that of the territorial sea boundary between the Soviet Union and Norway. The Soviets claim that the boundary should extend from the demarcation line north toward the pole, while the Norwegians claim that it should extend at forty-five degrees from the baseline (see Figure 2). At stake are the potentially rich fishing and undersea mineral and oil deposits in that region.

⁴⁰Ausland. pp. 174-175.




FIGURE 2. NORWEGIAN CLAIMED AREA OF MILITARY RESPONSIBILITY AND THE DISPUTED "GRAY ZONE".
 (Source: Norwegian Defense Review, 1991. Published by the Norwegian Defense Association.)

Norway decided to cast its lot with NATO when the pan-Nordic security initiative fell apart in the late

1940s.⁴¹ At that time Norway was militarily weak and, having no illusions about the aggressive nature of Soviet expansionism, saw an alliance with the West as its best protection. Aware however of Russian sensitivities toward strengthening military forces in the region, Norway refused the presence of nuclear weapons in the country (later to be amended to nuclear weapons would not be stored in country during peacetime) and the stationing of non-Norwegian troops in Norway during peacetime.⁴² Since then, the importance of Norway as a partner in the Alliance as steadily increased.

With the shift of the main Soviet fleet strength from the Baltic to the Northern Seas, the military build up of the Kola Peninsula, and the increasing importance of SSBNs in The Soviet strategic force posture, the Northern Flank and the Norwegian Sea became more important to Western planners from the 1980s onward. NATO maritime forces have since conducted a steady series of exercises in Norway's fjords and the Norwegian Sea.⁴³

⁴¹Berner, p. 64.

⁴²James Stark, "Norway," in Taylor and Cole, pp. 108-112; and Berner, p. 84.

⁴³See Eric Grove, ed., NATO's Defense of the North (London: Brassey's (UK), 1989), pp. 2-3, and 33-4; and "The Maritime Strategy Supplement."

C. THE FUTURE FOR SOVIET-SCANDINAVIAN RELATIONS

Thirty five nations gathered in Helsinki in the summer of 1975 to become signatories to the "Helsinki Accords" devised by the Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe (CSCE). The accords marked a new period of East-West cooperation that was to last until the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan. The summit has been compared to the Congress of Vienna and the post-World War I Peace Conference in Versailles.⁴⁴ The United States and Canada were included in precursory discussions at the insistence of NATO countries and became signatories.

The main Soviet objective at the conference was to gain de facto recognition of the status quo in Europe; i.e. a divided Germany and Eastern Europe under Soviet domination. The in "spirit of detente", the Western side was willing to accept the existing boundaries in Europe if the Soviets would allow possible change to take place in Eastern Europe. The United States attitude was slightly different from that of the Western Europe's since it was in the midst of strategic weapons negotiations with the Soviets. It feared

⁴⁴John J. Maresca, "Helsinki Accord, 1975," in U.S.-Soviet Security Cooperation, ed. Alexander L. George, Philip J. Farley, and Alexander Dallin (New York: Oxford University Press, 1988), p. 106. This chapter gives a good account of the background and objective of the main players at the conference; the United States, the Soviet Union, and Western Europe.

that the Accords would raise undue optimism at home toward reaching a strategic agreement and thought that nothing meaningful would be accomplished in Helsinki.⁴⁵

During the late Carter and early Reagan administrations, CSCE lost much of its impetus due to increased East-West tensions after the Afghan invasion by the USSR. It did however remain important in that period for citing reported human rights violations by the Soviets. Gorbachev brought renewed interest in the Accords when in 1985 he stated:

The Political Bureau starts from the assumption that the interstate documents of the "detente" period, including the Helsinki Final Act, have lost none of their value. They are an example of the way in which international relations can be built. . .⁴⁶

When the Conventional Forces Europe (CFE) Treaty was signed by twenty two countries in Paris in November, 1990, it was hailed as the end of the European armed camp and the final act of World War II. Under the treaty both NATO and Warsaw Pact [sic] forces would make large reductions in their conventional forces stationed between the Atlantic and the Urals. Even before sending the treaty to the U.S.

⁴⁵Maresca, p. 109.

⁴⁶"Helsinki: Ten Years Later, Report of the Soviet Committee for Security and Cooperation in Europe" (Moscow: Progress, 1985), p. 31, as quoted in Maresca, p. 118.

Senate for ratification, questions and issues of Soviet non-compliance grew. Three Soviet motorized infantry divisions that would have been counted under CFE counting rules were transferred to the Kola Peninsula and subordinated to the Navy as "Costal Defense Units."⁴⁷ Additionally, Soviet Air Force, dual capable, attack aircraft have been transferred to naval control on the Kola as well.⁴⁸ This led to concern in the Bush Administration that the Soviet Military has reasserted control of the arms control process and was becoming more involved in national security decision making. Administration analysis believe:

[t]he Soviet military is particularly unhappy with the new agreement cutting conventional forces in Europe, which codifies the withdrawal of Soviet forces from Eastern Europe and which requires Moscow to make much greater weapons cuts than the West.⁴⁹

⁴⁷Statement of Rear Admiral Thomas A. Brooks, USN, before the Seapower, Strategic, and Critical Materials Subcommittee of the House Armed Services Committee on Intelligence Issues, 7 March 1991, p. 17.

⁴⁸Ibid, p. 11 and p. 17. Brooks sees the Soviet Navy's role in defense of the homeland increasing as the CFE cuts take place. Although land based naval aircraft is not included in the treaty limited equipment, the Soviets reluctantly agreed to state that "they would not have more than 400 land based combat (my parenthesis) naval aircraft in the Atlantic to the Urals (ATTU) by 40 months after CFE entry-into-force.

⁴⁹"Outlook is Cloudy for an Arms Deal by U.S. and Soviets," New York Times, National Edition, 6 February 1991, p. A6(W).

Remembering the Carter administration's failure with the second round of the Strategic Arms Limitations Talks (SALT II), the present administration had second thoughts about submitting CFE to the Senate, recent discussions have resolved most issues and the treaties appear to be back on track.⁵⁰

Norwegian concern over the Soviet military build up in the Kola region is expressed in their press and in the writings of their military leadership. Although CFE reduced military tensions along the Central Front, Norway fears that the flanks have become more vulnerable, but that the Alliance may be lulled into a false sense of Nordic security.⁵¹

The history of Soviet-Scandinavian relations has at times been strained on both the military and diplomatic fronts over the past four and a half decades. Overall, however, it has remained one of peaceful, balanced co-existence. Given the present unrest in the Soviet Union,

⁵⁰Refer to Thomas L. Friedman, "Arms Talks: A Warm-Up," New York Times, 10 June 1991, p. A1(W).

⁵¹Captain Hallin, RNN, Norwegian Naval Attache, interview by author, notes taken during the interview, Washington, D.C., 11 April 1991.

especially the Baltic region, the question is whether this will this last?

The five countries that comprise the Nordic region are roughly equivalent in size to the combined areas of France, what was West Germany, and the United Kingdom, but its population is only one-eighth. Two share a common border with the Soviet Union. These five countries are the Soviet Union's second largest trading partner in the free world and only eight other countries have higher gross national products (GNPs) than the combined GNPs of this group.⁵² Recent discoveries of petroleum and natural gas have made the littorals of these nations not only strategically important, but economically important as well.

Scandinavia will continue to be of economic and strategic importance to the Soviet Union. Having stated its intent to scale back its involvement in the third world, to create a military based on *defensive sufficiency*, but also to continue modernization of the facilities in the Kola peninsula, the Nordic region will, in all likelihood, become more vital for the Soviet Union. Regardless of what changes take place the Soviets are masters of *Realpolitik* and must consider the regional balance of power.

⁵²Berner, p. 2.

The Soviet Union remains a strong nation militarily having the capability to disrupt international commerce and communication to our vital interest. If we wish to continue our traditionally close security and political ties with the Nordic countries, we need to reassess our strategy in this critical region.

III. THE POST WORLD WAR II U.S. MARITIME STRATEGY

If asked what the maritime strategy of the United States is, most naval officers will describe the strategy developed and implemented during the 1980s under the outspoken Secretary of the Navy (SecNav), John Lehman in concert with the Chief of Naval Operations (CNO), Admiral James D. Watkins and Commandant of the Marine Corps (CMC), P. X. Kelly.⁵³ So successful was the public relations selling campaign of the "Lehman Strategy," few people outside, or for that matter inside, the Navy know of any other.

The development of the maritime strategy of the United States however, is not a onetime strategy as this might suggest. The maritime strategy has been and remains a dynamic strategy requiring constant review to ensure it remains responsive to the international and domestic interest of the United States. The end of the "Cold-War"

⁵³ Although there is an abundance of published material concerning the "Maritime Strategy" of Lehman, Watkins, and Kelly, probably the best unclassified material is: Congress, Senate, Committee on Armed Services, Subcommittee on Sea Power and Power Projection, Secretary of the Navy John Lehman addressing the Maritime Strategy, 98th Cong., 2nd Sess., 14 March 1984; "The Maritime Strategy Supplement" to Proceedings (January 1986); and John B. Hattendorf, "The Evolution of the Maritime Strategy: 1977 to 1987," Naval War College Review (Summer 1988), pp. 7-22.

presents a new set of challenges for the Navy. As recent events in the Persian Gulf have shown, the Soviet Union is no longer the only potential adversary of consequence the United States must plan for in the coming years. If strategic planners wish to be effective, a basic historic knowledge pertaining to the roots of the present strategy is required. Only then can sound judgements be made. From many indications, the U.S. Navy again finds itself in the position of justifying its mission as it has after every conflict since its conception⁵⁴. The following overview of the evolution of the Navy's post-World War II strategy is not meant to be all-inclusive; it is intended only to provide the reader a chain of major events leading to the present Atlantic strategy and to show the failures and successes of Naval leadership along the way. By learning from the mistakes and capitalizing on the successes of the past, developing an Atlantic strategy for the 1990s and beyond is made easier.

⁵⁴Eliot A. Cohen, "After the Battle," The New Republic (1 April 1991), p. 19; states that since the Spanish-American War, American politicians have been divided over the role and size of the U.S. Navy as witnessed in the debate over building T. Roosevelt's "Great White Fleet." The debate goes back even farther to the building of frigates to protect American commerce on the high seas.

A. THE AMERICAN MARITIME STRATEGY: 1945-1976

Although the United States maritime strategy can be traced back to the origins of the American Navy, the present strategy is a direct result of the position the United States found itself in at the end of the Second World War. The U.S. Navy was by far the largest and most powerful armada the world had ever witnessed.⁵⁵ Just its size in manpower alone was staggering.⁵⁶ Its far ranging fast carrier battle groups and powerful amphibious forces had vanquished Japan's naval might in the Pacific while simultaneously working with the British to overcome the threat of German "wolf packs" in the Atlantic that had threatened the sea lines of communication (SLOCs) to Europe. The only remaining naval power that was capable of seriously challenging the U.S. Navy, the Royal Navy, was

⁵⁵ Michael A. Palmer, Origins of the Maritime Strategy, Contributions to naval history series; no. 1 (Washington, D.C.: U.S. Government Printing Office, 1987), p. 1.

⁵⁶ On 1 July 1940 the navy had only 13,162 officers and 744,824 enlisted men; on 31 August 1945 it had 316,675 officers and 2,935,695 enlisted men. Similar figures for the Marine Corps are 1819 officers and 26,545 enlisted men in 1940; 36,851 officers and 427,017 enlisted men at the end of the war. These figures do not include 8399 women officers and 73,685 enlisted women of the "Waves"; 813 officers and 17,350 enlisted women Marines, and 10,968 nurses, all at the end of the war. Samuel E. Morison, The Two-Ocean War (Boston: Little, Brown and Company, 1963), p. 586.

allied with the U.S. and not considered a threat.⁵⁷ Although Soviet post-war consolidation of Eastern Europe and its expansionist policies posed a threat to the free world, its military power was concentrated in the Red Army, a continental power. China, in the midst of a civil war, was not considered a naval power. The Soviet Navy was mainly a small defensive force, with very limited power projection capability. It did however, own the second largest submarine force in the world.⁵⁸ The U.S Navy gradually assumed the role that the Royal Navy had previously filled, that of maintaining the Western world's oceanic commerce routes and "showing the flag" as an instrument of America's foreign policy. However, the Navy's historic position as the primary instrument of foreign policy was being challenged by politics and advancements in technology.

Several factors account for the status the Navy found itself in immediately following the war. Its very success in the war gave cause for some members of government to question the need for a large navy. If there was no longer a naval threat posed, why maintain a navy?⁵⁹ The newly

⁵⁷Great Britain was embroiled in a series of post-war governmental and colonial problems.

⁵⁸ Jan Breemer, p. 75.

formed U.S. Air Force argued that strategic bombers carrying atomic bombs made navies obsolete. Future wars would be atomic wars that would be fought by high altitude super-bombers or as envisioned by some farsighted individuals, Intercontinental Ballistic Missiles (ICBMs).

Another factor was the "isolationist" holdover element in Congress and the public from the inter-war years. The United States had fought the good fight; now it was time to bring the "boys" home. The left over colonial problems of the post-war period were Europe's problems. Looming in the forefront were questions of how to centralize federal control of the military and the cost of maintaining armed forces to deal with emerging international realities.

Under Congressional pressure to unify the Armed Forces, the Departments of Navy and War were combined to form the Department of Defense with the Departments of the Army, the Navy, and the Air Force subordinate to it. The respective service chiefs formed the Joint Chiefs of Staff (JCS) who were supposedly subordinate to the Chairman of the Joint

⁵⁹Palmer, 1-2; This view lead to the super-carrier (the *U.S.S. United States*, whose keel had been laid) versus the super-bomber (the B-36) debate in Congress ultimately leading to the infamous "Revolt of the Admirals" for which the CNO at the time, Admiral Denfeld, was ultimately relieved of his job on 27 October 1949. The resulting inter-service rivalry has lasted to the present. For further details see Palmer, Chapters 1-4.

Chiefs (CJCS) whose position was filled on a rotating basis by the three services (the Marine Corps is considered part of the Department of the Navy). By combining the services in this manner, Congress hoped that component force needs would be clarified and better controlled to meet national interest in a period of fiscal austerity. This scenario should sound familiar to the reader of the early 1990s.

As events would have it, world developments began to shape U.S. policy. Events in 1948 caused the Western world to take notice of Soviet consolidation of power in Eastern Europe. There were uprisings in Soviet occupied East Germany and Czechoslovakia; the Soviets blockaded Western access to West Berlin; communist forces in Greece were conducting a civil war; and George Kennan, as head of the U.S. State Department's Policy Planning Staff, formulated National Security Memorandum 20 (NSC/20), which with the Marshall Plan, formed the United States' answer to apparent Soviet expansionist foreign policy. The "Containment Strategy," as NSC/20 became known and the follow on NSC/68, formed the basis of U.S. global strategy for almost three decades.⁶⁰

⁶⁰For background information on events leading up to the formulation and implementation of NSC/20, see the following: George F. Kennan, American Diplomacy, Expanded Edition (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1984), pp. 107-54;

As early as 1946, the U.S. Navy had identified the Soviet Union as the new threat to American security, "a foe against which the Navy must prepare to fight as much ashore as at sea."⁶¹ Conventional forces such as a navy are expensive to procure and maintain. Nuclear forces however, are less expensive and since the primary threat was the Red Army, the strategic nuclear forces concept carried the day in Congressional budgeting. Accordingly, the Navy, so as not to be subordinate to the Air Force's bomber forces, began to develop its own plans for naval attack aircraft and carriers capable of launching nuclear strikes against the Soviet Union. Simultaneously plans were developed for submarines capable of carrying nuclear armed missiles and hunter-killer submarines that would go after Soviet submarines in their home waters.⁶²

John L. Gaddis, Strategies of Containment (New York: Oxford University Press, 1982), pp. 25-88; and Frederick H. Hartmann and Robert L. Wendzel, Defending America's Security (New York: Brassey's (US), 1990), p. 129. Kennan would later state that his intentions with regard to containing Soviet expansionism was to bring diplomatic and economic pressure to bear vice military pressure. See the foreword in American Diplomacy. For background on NSC/68 see: Gaddis, pp. 82-95.

⁶¹Palmer, p. 7. Vice Admiral Harry W. Hill, reviewing the "Basic Post-War Plan No. 1 as directed by Fleet Admiral Ernest King, judged that a war with the Soviet Union would not be a war at sea in the classic sense, fought only with naval combatants, but would necessitate a balanced "Navy" force utilizing air, sea, land, and support forces.

Rumors that the Soviets might force Norway into agreeing to a treaty such as the one signed with Finland, galvanized these countries into a regional security pact to check perceived Soviet expansion into this vital geo-strategic area.⁶³ On August 24, 1949, the United States joined with Great Britain, France and other West European countries to form the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO). As a result, the NATO alliance became the predominate focal point of American political and military planners until the present, often at the expense of other regions of the world. (The possible exception being Southeast Asia during the Vietnam War. This "Europe First" posture is in many ways, the root of American policy failure in other parts of the world.)⁶⁴

⁶³Ibid, pp. 24-62. In the spring of 1946, the Navy conducted "Operation Frostbite" with Midway class carriers in sub-arctic waters to test their capabilities in these regions. Although tempo was reduced, they proved that such operations were possible. In the spring of 1949, a group of U.S. conventional-powered fleet submarines; *Tusk*, *Cochino*, *Toro*, and *Corsair*, operated in the Barents Sea as far east as 30° East and within 12 nm of North Cape. The success of the mission established the diesel powered hunter-killer (SSK) program in the U.S. Navy.

⁶³Kennedy-Minott, p. 2.

⁶⁴ Robert W. Komer, "Maritime Strategy vs. Coalition Defense," Foreign Affairs (Summer 1983), p. 1127. Komer notes that the United States had focus its post World War II policy attention on Europe and Northeast Asia, preparing for a possible 2-1/2 front war. The Sino-Soviet split in the 1960s allowed the Nixon-Ford administration to shift to a 1-

Admiral Forrest Sherman, as Deputy Chief of Naval Operations (Operations), 1946-47, and his staff devised the Navy's first true post-war maritime strategy that guided Navy planning until the mid-1950s. It called for the Navy to "assume the offensive immediately in order to secure our own sea communications, support our forces overseas, disrupt enemy operations, and force dissipation of enemy strength."⁶⁵ Although engaging the Soviet Navy in the Arctic regions was discussed, Sherman believed that the main area of concern for the Atlantic fleet should be the Mediterranean. He did recognize that the Northern region's importance would grow over time, but that operations in the area were presently too difficult.⁶⁶ Sherman's proposed strategy sounds very much like the strategy of Secretary Lehman three and a half decades later; only the relative importance of the regions are reversed.

1/2 front, Eurocentric mentality. This in turn allowed events such as the demise of the Central Treaty Organization (CENTO), the fall of the Shah, and the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan to occur.

⁶⁵Palmer, p. 30.

⁶⁶Ibid. Sherman believed that advancements in missile technology and aircraft would be the factors shifting the balance toward the north and it would be necessary for the U.S. to control the region so our strategic aircraft could operate there.

The strategy had an Achilles heel however; the lack of public dissemination. Elements of the plan were militarily and politically sensitive. Even members of Congress were frustrated by the lack of information available.⁶⁷ The Navy was to suffer from this flaw in the coming years.

By 1953, the Strategic Plans Division of the Navy, noting the build up of naval capability in the Kola Peninsula, began to focus its attention toward Soviet North Fleet operations. A study released in October stated that:

The Northeast Atlantic-Norwegian Sea-Barents Sea area may well be the area of decision with respect to the success of any United States operations to maintain the flow of supplies to our European Allies and to our U.S. forces in Western Europe. This area is of two fold importance -- first as an avenue for the movement of U.S. shipping; secondly, as the area from which the Soviet submarine threat may be stopped at its source. . . . Of further importance is the fact that the northwestern and northern coast of Norway are extremely attractive sites for submarine bases. The fjords are ideal places to construct sub pens tunneled into cliffs rising from the sea. Were the Soviet[s] to capture these coastal areas by amphibious operations, they could construct submarine bases in the fjords that would be all but invulnerable to air attack. Another critical aspect of this area is the fact that the Barents Sea is the attack route to the only significant submarine base for Atlantic submarines now available to the Soviets. With the Bosphorus and Baltic exits

⁶⁷Ibid. The plan assumed that if war were to break out, most of Europe would be rapidly overrun by the Red Army. Therefore the Navy planned to forward base its assets in bases in the southern Mediterranean.

sealed, Soviet submarines must be operated from their northern bases.⁶⁸

Although Burke's office circulated the study, events outside the control of the Navy were to establish new guide lines for Navy planning.

The Defense Department Reorganization Plan 6 of April 1953 brought a change to the strategic planning process of the Navy. Before that time, the service chiefs were largely responsible for their respective plans. Plan 6 called for giving increase powers to the Secretary of Defense, CJCS, the Service Secretaries, and the unified commanders.⁶⁹ The Navy's failure to promulgate its "maritime strategy" as developed by Admiral Sherman resulted in a failure to influence joint military and national policy. Additionally, the Eisenhower Administration's belief that nuclear weapons were an economical alternative to conventional forces resulted in a reorganization of naval planning from classical naval missions toward development of a nuclear

⁶⁸Rear Admiral Arleigh A. Burke to list, 13 October 1953, enclosing a study of attack carrier force levels, A4, box 280, Strategic Plans, as quoted in Palmer, p. 77. The statement is based on the assumption that the Turks and the Danes would cooperate and be capable of closing the straits.

⁶⁹Fredrick H. Hartmann and Robert L. Wendzel, Defending America's Security, 2nd ed. (New York: Brassey's (US), 1990), chapters 10 and 11, contain an excellent overview of DOD reform attempts.

strike capability against land based targets. The key to solving the budgeting problems in that period was to have a nuclear mission.⁷⁰ U.S. carriers were assigned a strategic role on the Northern Flank, that of conducting nuclear strikes which lead to building up forces centered around Murmansk and equipping Soviet naval vessels with Surface to Surface Missiles (SSM) for anti-carriers missions.⁷¹ This nuclear mentality was to dominate until the Kennedy-Johnson Administrations developed the "flexible response" strategy of the 1960's, in many ways similar to the Reagan Administration's military posture of vertical and horizontal escalation.⁷² It called for strengthening America's conventional forces which Kennedy believed had been neglected during the Eisenhower era.⁷³

⁷⁰John L. Gaddis, Strategies of Containment (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1982), pp. 148, 152, and 184. Additionally, the report of the "Gaither Committee" to Congress as sighted on pages 184-5, offered a share of the strategic deterrence mission to each branch of the Armed Forces reinforced development of the Navy nuclear mission.

⁷¹Tunander, Cold Water Politics, p. 25.

⁷²Norman Friedman, The Maritime Strategy (London: Jane's Publications, 1988), pp. 1-149, 155-75, and 182-205 discuss the concepts of vertical and horizontal escalation in war fighting.

⁷³Gaddis, pp. 198-217.

U.S. security interests in the Nordic region during this period has been sometimes described as "benign neglect." The Soviet buildup on the Kola Peninsula had not caught the eye of Western security analyst yet. Sweden's military power was considered capable of deterring any Soviet expansion in the region, but by the late 1980s, its force structure was only half of the size it had been in the 1950s/1960s.⁷⁴ It took the United States until the mid-1970s to realize the region could no longer be ignored.

B. THE BUILDUP OF THE SOVIET NAVY IN THE POST-WAR PERIOD

The Soviet Navy during this period began to recover from the devastation brought upon it by Germany. Soviet maritime strategy following the war was a defensive strategy aimed at denying projection of American and British naval power against the Soviet Homeland.⁷⁵ Stalin, having witnessed the global power projection capability of the U.S. Navy in the Pacific, envisioned a build up of the Soviet Fleet enabling this defensive strategy. Fleets and ships require a long

⁷⁴Tunander, Cold Water Politics, p. 125.

⁷⁵Bryan Ranft and Geoffrey Till, The Sea in Soviet Strategy, 2nd ed. (Annapolis, MD: Naval Institute Press, 1989), p. 99. Stalin seemed to fear an amphibious invasion by the West. Perhaps the memory of Western forces occupying Archangel after the Revolution was still fresh.

time to build up however, and the lack of offensive naval power was to prove troublesome for Soviet foreign policy in the late 1940s. U.S. and British maritime strength in the Mediterranean preventing direct Soviet naval intervention in the Greek communist uprising.⁷⁶

The death of Stalin in 1953 resulted in a reversal of the planned build up. The Ministry of Defense (MOD) was dominated by the Army. The Soviets, like the West earlier, came to regard nuclear weapons as the predominate force equalizer for future wars and that large navies were obsolete. Khrushchev, in his push to make the Soviet Union economically equal or superior to the United States, cancelled the large naval combatant building programs, wishing to concentrate on smaller units, especially submarines and aircraft capable of carrying nuclear weapons.

Khrushchev appointed Admiral Sergei Gorshkov to oversee the build down. In a twist of fate, Gorshkov was to oversee the expansion of the Soviet Navy to a force capable of challenging the United States naval supremacy. Gorshkov had commanded naval forces with distinction in the Black Sea during World War II, attaining the rank of Rear Admiral in 1941, after only ten years of commissioned service. He rose

⁷⁶Ibid, p. 100.

rapidly to positions of power and was serving as First Deputy Commander-in-Chief of the Soviet Navy by 1955. Khrushchev, who wanted someone who agreed with his outlook and would follow the Party line to command the Navy, appointed Gorshkov Commander-in-Chief in 1956. It is ironic that Gorshkov was chosen because under his tutelage, the Soviet Navy began the largest expansion in its history transforming into a "blue water" force.⁷⁷

In the early 1970s, Gorshkov published a series of eleven articles in Morskoi Sbornik (the Naval Review) entitled 'Navies in War and Peace.' This seminal work was later expanded into a second edition that was eventually translated into English as The Sea Power of the State. It was immediately compared to Mahan's Influence of Sea Power on History. Whether Gorshkov's work was meant to be an indication of the Soviet Navy's focus and purpose is debatable; what is not debatable is the attention it received from Western naval analysis.⁷⁸

⁷⁷Ibid, pp. 78-81.

⁷⁸Ibid, pp. 81-92. Two schools of thought seem to predominate the debate. One side, identified with naval analyst Michael McGwire, sees Sea Power as "a fundamental shift in the theoretical basis of Soviet Naval Policy." McGwire foresaw the mission of the Soviet Navy as being able to defeat the Western naval alliance by conventional means. This meant that the conventional war could possibly be a protracted global war and the Soviet Navy must possess

The 1962 Cuban missile crisis and the Soviet Navy's inability to counter U.S. naval force was just what Gorshkov needed to revitalize Soviet ship building programs and expand operations⁷⁹. (See Tables 1 and 2) It was these expanded operations that gradually galvanized (forced) Western naval leadership into producing a response that became "The Maritime Strategy" under Secretary Lehman.

the numbers and capability to deal with the West. The other side is often identified with naval analysis James M. McConnell. McConnell believed that regional conflicts would quickly escalate into a global nuclear war between the Soviets and the United States which would require a completely different navy. For details on the debate see: James M. McConnell, "The Gorshkov Articles, the New Gorshkov Book, and their relation to Policy," in M.K. McGwire and J. McDonnell, eds. Soviet Naval Influence: Domestic and Foreign Dimensions (New York, Washington, London: Praeger, 1977), pp. 54-7 and 565-620; McGwire, "A New Trend in Soviet Naval Development," Naval War College Review, (July/August 1980).

⁷⁹Hattendorf, p. 8.

TABLE 1: U.S. AND SOVIET SHIPBUILDING DELIVERIES, 1961-1975
 (Source: Joint Chiefs of Staff, Soviet Shipbuilding Deliveries, 1961-1975, 20 May 1976.)

<i>Type of ship</i>	<i>USSR</i>	<i>US</i>
Ballistic missile submarines	54	38
Attack submarines	177	57
Major surface combatants (3,000 tons and more)	57	117
Major surface combatants (1,000-3,000 tons)	83	2
Minor surface combatants (incl. amphibious)	1,175	71
Underway replenishment ships	4	25
Other support ships	199	17
Total	1,749	327

TABLE 2: SOVIET NAVAL STRENGTH AND DISPOSITION OF OPERATIONAL FORCES BY FLEET: 1973-1984 (Source: compiled from successive issues of: IISS, The Military Balance, as cited in Robert G. Weinland, "The Soviet Naval Buildup in the High North: A Reassessment," Sverre Jervell and Kare Nyblom, eds., The Military Build up of the High North (Lanham, MD: Center for International Affairs Harvard University and University Press of America, 1986), 25.)

Soviet Navy--Strength and Disposition of Operational Forces by Fleet: 1973-1984*												
	<u>Ballistic Missile Submarines</u>				<u>Attack Submarines</u>				<u>Major Surface Combatants</u>			
	<u>NO</u>	<u>BA</u>	<u>BL</u>	<u>PA**</u>	<u>NO</u>	<u>BA</u>	<u>BL</u>	<u>PA</u>	<u>NO</u>	<u>BA</u>	<u>BL</u>	<u>PA</u>
1973	46	-	-	20	124	43	31	87	45	52	63	52
1974	49	-	-	21	111	30	28	79	56	50	60	55
1975	53	-	-	22	122	35	25	83	60	55	65	60
1976	53	6	-	23	126	12	19	74	51	47	59	57
1977	50	6	-	26	110	35	20	70	50	50	60	60
1978	53	6	-	31	120	30	25	70	55	50	73	65
1979	52	6	-	32	120	30	25	75	70	50	75	70
1980	48	6	-	33	135	25	25	80	80	40	85	80
1981	45	6	-	24	135	22	22	80	82	42	84	86
1982	45	6	-	25	140	24	20	95	75	50	80	85
1983	46	6	-	28	135	24	25	92	76	40	83	89
1984	42	6	-	31	138	26	24	102	80	45	80	88

*Compiled from successive issues of: IISS, The Military Balance

**NO = Northern Fleet
BA = Baltic Fleet
BL = Black Sea Fleet
PA = Pacific Fleet

Soviet naval exercise activity prior to the 1962 Cuban missile crisis consisted mainly of defense of the homeland exercises and very little open ocean excursions. The Navy

was considered subordinate to the Army to support a land war in Europe. In 1961, the first Soviet Fleet out of area (OOA) exercise of significance took place in the Norwegian Sea. It consisted of eight surface combatants, associated auxiliary units and as many as four submarines participated. The goals were simple and the exercise was of brief duration, but it marked the beginning of an increased naval presence beyond the Soviet Union's littoral.⁸⁰

The period from 1963 to 1970 saw a significant increase in the number and complexity of Soviet exercises in the Norwegian Sea and the North Atlantic. In 1963, a surface group circumnavigated the British Isles and inter-fleet transfers between the Black Sea, Baltic and Northern Fleets increased. The Soviet Mediterranean Squadron (SovMedRon) was established in 1964. The Summer 1965 exercise saw a scenario that placed combatants in the Iceland-Faeroe-United Kingdom gaps to simulate opposing the entry of NATO naval units into the Norwegian Sea.⁸¹

By 1969, the Soviet Navy had developed into a force capable of "showing the flag" globally and had developed its

⁸⁰See charts in: NATO Letter, No. 9 (September 1970) [the forerunner to NATO Review].

⁸¹Ibid.

own mission divorced from supporting the Army.⁸² The first world wide OKEAN (OCEAN) exercise was held by the Soviet Navy in the Spring of 1970. Although the sinking of a November class nuclear submarine involved got the exercise off to a shaky start, overall it was a success. The Soviets conducted exercises south of the Greenland-Iceland-United Kingdom (GIUK) Gap which involved fleet-on-fleet engagements, multi-platform coordination including Soviet Naval Aviation (SNA), and finally an amphibious landing on the Kola Peninsula. A series of spring exercises between 1973-1976 saw the continued refinement of a defensive barrier strategy in the choke points of the GIUK Gap. The largest Soviet naval exercise to present, OKEAN-75, was held in the summer of 1975.

The Kiev class V/STOL carrier was introduced into the fleet in the summer of 1976 and conducted operations in the Atlantic prior to transfer to the Northern Fleet. The Kiev gave the Soviet Navy its first true organic air support capability. Although its complement of Vertical/Short Take-off and Landing (VSTOL) YAK-36 *Forgers* was out classed by

⁸²Ranft and Till, p. 80. The SSBN fleet had become a "second strike" force separate from the Strategic Rocket Forces. The Soviet Navy's primary mission was no longer supporting amphibious warfare for the Army. It was now capable of conducting operations against Western navies.

American carrier based tactical aircraft, they were capable of an anti-ship role and could certainly counter allied maritime patrol aircraft (MPA).

SpringEx '77 witnessed massive use of SNA simulating waves of anti-carrier air-to-surface (ASM) strikes against an aggressor CVBG, the establishment of defensive submarine barriers, and the break out of forces south of the "Gap" to threaten the Atlantic SLOCs to Europe. This is essentially the pattern that Soviet exercises followed through the mid-1980s and may have contributed to the evolution of the Forward Maritime Strategy in the Norwegian Sea (See Figure 3).⁸³

⁸³The information on Soviet Naval exercise activity was compiled from a reprint of: NATO Letter, No. 9 (September 1970) [the forerunner to NATO Review]; NATO Review, No. 6 (December 1976); and NATO Review, No. 1 (February 1986). These three sources provide good charts and overviews of the exercises. Also see: R. van Tol, "Soviet Naval Exercises 1983-1985," Naval Forces, Vol. 2 (June 1986), pp. 20-34; and Ranft and Till.




FIGURE 3: TYPICAL SOVIET EXERCISE PATTERN FROM 1977 TO THE MID-1980S. (Source of graphic, PC-Globe, 3.0; Details compiled from sources in footnote 21.)

C. THE U.S. MARITIME STRATEGY: 1976-1989

From the mid-1960s through the evacuation of Saigon in April 1975, American naval strategy and commitments were sharply divided between NATO and Southeast Asia. With the end of American involvement in Vietnam, the United States underwent a period of self-examination. The national political leadership was disgraced after the Watergate

scandal. The Navy was beset by a multitude of problems in the post-Zumwalt era.⁸⁴ The growth of the Soviet fleet and its expanded presence in areas that had previously been deemed exclusive Western areas of influence, (i.e.; Southeast Asia, Africa, the Indian Ocean, and the Pacific Ocean) resulted in new commitments for the Navy that increased as the era of "detente" faded by the end of the decade. This could not have come at a worst time for the Navy. Many of the vessels that had been used for operations during in the war were reaching the end of their service lives and were not being replaced at the rate of decommissioning. Critical mid-level personnel were leaving the service in large numbers preventing, in some cases, ships from meeting underway obligations. The all-volunteer military was struggling to recruit sufficient numbers of qualified personnel in the post-war period due to low pay, long hours and multi-year obligations.

⁸⁴Admiral Elmo Zumwalt was the Chief of Naval Operations from July 1970-July 1974 and instituted numerous reforms in the Navy, some of which did not sit well with the institution bias. Hartmann and Wendzel, p. 198; state that "[Zumwalt's] period in office was marked by a great deal of turbulence and much less in the way of progress. What was present in this period was energy, intelligence, and zest; what was lacking was mature judgement, and deliberate, careful change.

An issue of concern for the Navy was the future force size. The Department of Defense offered little help on this matter. Under three Secretaries of Defense in five years, naval force structure goals seemingly changed at whim. (see Table 3) There is little wonder why the Navy seemed to lack a sense of direction.

TABLE 3: NAVAL FORCE STRUCTURE GOALS SET UNDER SECDEF GUIDANCE 1975-1978.⁸⁵

Time Frame	SecDef	Ship Goals
1975	Schlesinger	575
1976	Rumsfeld	600
1977-78	Brown	425-500*

Although this has painted a bad picture, the Navy began recover in the late 1970s. Groups within the Navy recognized the lack of a comprehensive and cohesive "maritime strategy." Military analysis and writers such as Jonathan Howe, Edward Luttwak, and Kenneth Booth began discussing again, the use of naval power to influence foreign policy.⁸⁶ CNO, Admiral Zumwalt categorized the four

⁸⁵Hattendorf, p. 10. *The 1977 DOD Consolidation Guidance plan submitted by the Carter Administration reflects its belief that the Surface Navy was for a peace keeping role and third world conflicts that the Soviets chose not to involve themselves in.

foreign policy.⁶⁶ CNO, Admiral Zumwalt categorized the four missions of the Navy: strategic deterrence, power projection, sea control, and naval presence.⁶⁷ A group of strategist that evolved into the Strategic Studies Group at the Naval War College became the theoretical prophets of the "new strategy."⁶⁸ However as Admiral Sherman learned in the early 1950s, a strategy without public support is not a strategy. What was needed to bring the plan to fruition were senior leaders with enough clout to get the attention of those who controlled the purse strings -- Congress-- and were vocal enough to reach the public. The efforts of the War College study group were beginning to pay off in this regard. Post-command officers who had completed the course

⁶⁶Refer to: Jonathan T. Howe, Multicrises (Cambridge: MIT Press, 1971); Edward N. Luttwak, The Political Uses of Sea Power (Baltimore:John Hopkins University Press 1975); Kenneth Booth, Navies and Foreign Policy (London: Croom Helm, 1977); and the key works of Rosinski and Rietzel, part of the group at the Naval War College that laid the foundations for the 1980s maritime strategy, that are contained in, B. Mitchell Simpson III, ed., War, Strategy and Maritime Strategy (New Brunswick, NJ: Rutgers University Press, 1977), pp. 63-110. Also see; Geoffrey Till, ed., Maritime Strategy and the Nuclear Age, 2nd ed. (New York: St. Martin's Press, 1984), pp. 181-225.

⁶⁷Kennedy-Minott, p. 7; Till, pp. 62-3; and Peter M. Swartz, "Contemporary U.S. Naval Strategy: A Bibliography," Proceedings (Maritime Strategy Supplement, January 1986), p. 41.

⁶⁸Hattendorf, pp. 13-18.

of study at Newport were moving into positions in the Office of the Chief of Naval Operations and the Fleet CINCs and leading the effort to establish strategic awareness in the Navy and Washington during the late 1970s.

The mind set in the Pentagon until then was that a war with the Soviet Union would primarily be fought in Europe on the Central Front; mainly by U.S. Army and Air Force units in concert with NATO air and ground forces and would quickly escalate into a nuclear exchange. The role envisioned for the U.S. Navy and its Alliance partners would be reminiscent of the "Battle for the Atlantic" fought during World War II. Naval vessels would escort convoys of war material to support forces on the Central Front, battle the Soviet submarine threat and any surface forces that broke through the "choke points" of the GIUK Gap and threatened the SLOCs.** The United States military and political leadership had been lulled into a "Maginot Line" mentality based on the technological edge afforded by the Sound Surveillance System (SOSUS), believing that Allied air and

**Evidence of such planning is noted in Kennedy-Minott, pp. 7-8; and Robert S. Wood, "Fleet Renewal and Maritime Strategy in the 1980s," Maritime Strategy and the Balance of Power, J.B. Hattendorf and R.S. Jordan, ed. (New York: St. Martin's Press, 1989), pp. 332-3. Freidman, pp. 56-58. Robert Wood, pp. 332-337; discusses the use of "choke points" in naval strategy.

sea forces would have adequate intelligence to deal with Soviet sea based threats surviving the barrier defenses comprised mainly of mines and Maritime Patrol Aircraft (MPA)(see Figure 4).⁹⁰ This defensive attitude was contrary to the offensive principles of Mahan's battle fleet theory and stifled naval power projection strategy.

Another problem with adopting the GIUK "Gap" mentality is its "de facto" establishment of the battle line south of Iceland, seemingly ceding the Norwegian Sea and northern Norway to the Soviets. This "omission" did not set well with the Norwegian Ministry of Defense. Under Secretary Lehman's strategy the lines were "redrawn" to include northern Norway and the line became the Greenland-Iceland-Norway "Gap."

⁹⁰Palmer, p. 82; and Eric Grove, NATO's Defense of the North, p. 4.




FIGURE 4: ANTI-SUBMARINE BARRIERS IN THE GIUK GAP. (Source: Eric Grove, ed. NATO's Defense of the North, Brassey's Atlantic Commentaries No. 1, (London: Brassey's (UK), 1989), 5.)

In the late 1970s, the American perspective of Soviet naval strategy began to change. Spurred by Robert W.

Herrick's Soviet Naval Strategy: Fifty Years of Theory and Practice⁹¹ and the writings of Admiral Gorshkov, some individuals in the intelligence organizations began to consider the Soviet Navy as mainly a defensive force.⁹² This ran counter to prevailing opinions; why would the Soviets build a large naval force if it were defensive in nature? This logic did not fit the American perspective of a large naval force.

Center for Naval Analyses (CNA) staff member James McConnell, wrote in the first chapter of a 1977 draft of Soviet Naval Diplomacy, the suggestion that the Soviet Union would withhold its SSBN force in a nuclear exchange as a second strike instrument.⁹³ This could explain the build up and the defensive nature of the Soviet Navy; a force for protecting the sea based leg of their strategic nuclear forces. (Refer to Table 2 for size of the North Fleet's SSBN force.) This would mature into the concept of a "Soviet SSBN Bastion" against which Allied attack submarines

⁹¹Robert W. Herrick, Soviet Naval Strategy: Fifty Years of Theory and Practice (Annapolis, MD: Naval Institute Press, 1968)

⁹²Hattendorf, pp. 11-12.

⁹³Bradford Dismukes and James M. McConnell, eds., Soviet Naval Diplomacy (New York: Pergamon Press, 1979). This lead to the "Bastion" theory prominent in the Lehman strategy.

would be tasked under the final stage of the new strategy, "Carrying the Fight to the Enemy".⁹⁴ By concentrating Western SSNs against these forces, U.S. maritime strategist hoped to gain an advantage in war termination. This strategy was a restatement of the principles of Mahan that called to seeking out and destroying the enemy's fleet. Critics of the "Anti-Bastion" strategy have stated that it was an escalatory campaign that would force the Soviet's into a "use them or lost them mind set"⁹⁵.

Almost simultaneously, two projects were developed changing Navy long-range planning to assume an active role. *Sea Strike Strategy*, developed by Admiral Thomas B. Hayward as Commander in Chief, Pacific Fleet, was a counter to the Carter Administration's Presidential Review Memorandum 10

⁹⁴See: Weinland (Table 2); Barry R. Posen, (The U.S. Military Response to Soviet Naval Developments in the High North," The Military Buildup of the High North, Sverre Jervell and Kare Nyblom, eds. (Landam, MD: Center for International Affairs Harvard University and University Press of America, 1986), pp. 45-58; and Richard Halloran, "Navy Trains to Battle Soviet Submarines in Arctic," New York Times, 19 May 1983, p. A17(W); for details on the "Soviet SSBN Bastions". For information on the phases of the Maritime Strategy refer to Watkins' article in the "Maritime Supplement.

⁹⁵Barry R. Posen, "Inadvertent Nuclear War? Escalation and NATO's Northern Flank," Steven E. Miller, ed., Strategy and Nuclear Deterrence, (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1984), pp. 96-104; John J. Mearsheimer, "A Strategic Misstep: The Maritime Strategy and Deterrence in Europe," International Security (Fall 1986), pp. 46-48.

(PRM-10) that called for a "Swing Strategy."⁹⁶ The Swing Strategy envisioned the Pacific Fleet steaming to the Atlantic in support of the Central Front. Hayward's strategy, in light of the growing strength of the Soviet Pacific Fleet, was to keep the U.S. Pacific fleet in the area and concentrate his forces against Soviet forces there. This "horizontal escalation" would open a second front and relieve pressure on the Central Front.⁹⁷ Additionally, Hayward believed that without widening the conflict, the war on the Central Front might be over before Pacific forces could get there in support.

Seaplan 2000 was developed under the direction of Secretary of the Navy, Graham Claytor, and Navy and Marine Corps leadership. It called for a coalition strategy that:

[would] strive for superiority at sea against the Soviets and, when examining the variety of possible wartime operations against the Soviet Navy, think in terms of forward, offensive operations as the most effective means for employing the Navy to achieve the Nation's broad defense policies.⁹⁸

⁹⁶Hattendorf, 10-11; and Hartmann and Wendzel, pp. 254-5.

⁹⁷See ADM Thomas B. Hayward, "The Future of U.S. Seapower," Proceedings/Naval Review (May 1979), pp. 66-71; for Hayward's view of the Navy's role on a global war with the Soviet Union.

⁹⁸Hattendorf, p. 11.

"Seaplan 2000" picked up the "Seastrike" theme of opening a second front against the Soviets in the Pacific and applied it to the Atlantic theater.

Admiral Hayward was given the chance to put into practice his strategic views when he was appointed the 21st Chief of Naval Operations in June 1978. Hayward quickly began to develop a "selling strategy" for the Navy's global strategy. He gave briefing to the military and civilian leadership in the Pentagon and on the Hill. In an unclassified version of his Naval Posture Statement to Congress for 1979 published in the May 1979 Proceedings/Naval Review, he called for a global strategy that was to become the Forward Maritime Strategy (FMS) of the Reagan Administration. Hayward's selling strategy was to move the debate on force structure from one that centered on the budget to one that centered on strategic needs.⁹⁹ He reasoned that if these needs were articulated skillfully to Congress and the Administration, force level would be commensurate.

⁹⁹Ibid, pp. 13-14. Much of this section of the article is based on Hattendorf interviewing Hayward at the Pentagon: 17 April 1985.

Hayward focused instead on increasing the readiness of the Navy by putting "his priority on spare parts, ammunition, pay, and benefits."¹⁰⁰ To ensure that the Navy would continue developing a coordinated strategy, Hayward established the Strategic Studies Group (SSG) at the Naval War College, which became the resource center for naval strategy and war gaming. As fate would have it, events were to assist implementation of Hayward's offensive strategy.

The overthrow of the Shah of Iran and the seizure of the U.S. embassy in November 1979 and the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan a month later, brought an end to the era of detente. The *Carter Doctrine*, a declaratory policy aimed primarily at the Soviet Union following the Afghan invasion, spelled out the vital interest of the United States in the Persian Gulf; mainly access to Middle East oil, and the lengths the United States would go protecting these interest. In his January 1980 State of the Union address to Congress, Carter stated:

An attempt by any outside force to gain control of the Persian Gulf region will be regarded as an assault on the vital interest of the United States of America, and such an assault will be repelled by any means necessary, including military force.¹⁰¹

¹⁰⁰Ibid.

As a means to put muscle behind the policy statement, the Administration asked for and received an increased military budget and developed the Rapid Deployment Joint Task Force (RDJTF) for contingency operations.¹⁰²

Despite the warning nature of the doctrine, the failed hostage rescue attempt caused many in Washington to question the capability of the U.S. armed forces. These events, plus a continuing economic crisis and the failure of the Administration to form a "well-developed, coherent design or consistent strategy" regarding the Soviet Union early on, lead to the defeat of Carter in the 1980 presidential campaign.¹⁰³ Thus, global events, the maturation of post-war naval strategy and the election of Ronald Reagan to the

¹⁰¹State of the Union address, 23 January 1980, reproduced in U.S. President, Public Papers of the Presidents of the United States: Jimmy Carter, 1980-81, book I: 1 January-23 May 1980 (Washington, D.C.: GPO), 197; as cited in Elizabeth D. Sherwood, Allies in Crisis (New Haven and London: Yale University Press, 1990), p. 148.

¹⁰²Sherwood, pp. 151-2.

¹⁰³Craig and George, p. 143. Also refer to: Gaddis, pp. 349-52. Gaddis believes that the failure of the Carter Administration was three fold: first, Carter's emphasis on human rights and morality was at the expense of a realistic foreign policy; second, "there was among the President's advisers, no dominate theorist;" and third, Carter had the misfortune of coming to office at a time when the Soviets were expanding the challenges to the global balance of power.

Presidency set the stage for the "Forward Maritime Strategy" of John Lehman.

Regardless what criticisms exist concerning John Lehman, one thing that can not be denied is that he brought renewed vigor to the naval forces debate when he assumed the Office of Secretary of the Navy in February 1981. He and Casper Weinberger were highly visible, articulate spokesmen for the U.S. military during the first half of the Reagan Administration. One of the cornerstones of the Reagan security policy was the belief that if a conflict were to break out between the NATO and the Warsaw Pact on the Central Front, it would not be a short conventional war with rapid escalation to a nuclear exchange.¹⁰⁴ Reagan called for a 1.6 trillion dollar defense authorization during the 1982-1986 period, the largest increase ever, to increase the capabilities of U.S. conventional and strategic forces.¹⁰⁵

The strategy that was implemented during the Reagan Administration under Secretary of the Navy John Lehman is possibly the most written on and debated military strategy of the post war period.¹⁰⁶ While the purpose of this paper

¹⁰⁴Hartmann and Wendzel, p. 261.

¹⁰⁵Robert W. Komer, "Maritime Strategy vs. Coalition Defense," Foreign Affairs, (Summer 1983), p. 1128. The majority of this was earmarked for conventional forces.

is not to dissect this strategy, it is important to have a working knowledge of the strategy and its consequences, not only to the United States, but also to its NATO Allies.

Critics have accused Lehman of using the "Forward Maritime Strategy" as a means for increasing the size of the Navy's force structure with his repeated calls for a 600 ship Navy. An additional criticism has been that it did not note the significance of the land campaign.¹⁰⁷ That Lehman used a declaratory policy for justifying force structure should not be surprising to anyone; that is what SecNav is suppose to do. As to the strategy being geared strictly towards offensive strikes against the Soviet heartland, that is as narrow-minded as the critics make Lehman out to be. The land campaign and the maritime campaign were linked

¹⁰⁶Hattendorf, p. 25; and Peter M. Swartz, and Jan Breemer with James Tritten, "The Maritime Strategy Debates: A Guide to the Renaissance of U.S. Naval Strategic Thinking in the 1980s," Naval Postgraduate School Technical Report NPS-56-88-009, 1989. This is an expanded bibliography and discussion of Captain Swartz's Maritime Supplement article. (See footnote #25)

¹⁰⁷Refer to Komer; ADM Stansfield Turner and CAPT George Thibault, "Preparing for the Unexpected: The Need for a New Strategy," Foreign Affairs (Fall 1983), pp. 123-135; and Barry A. Posen, "Inadvertent Nuclear War," International Security (Fall 1982), pp. 28-54. The critics of the maritime strategy have been collectively called the "Continentalist," referring to their land oriented strategical viewpoint. See Kennedy-Minott, pp. 13-16 for a description.

together.¹⁰⁸ The operational plans (OP PLANS) and concepts of operations (CONOPS) that would guide U.S. forces in a European conflict are written to reflect this realization.¹⁰⁹

Admiral Watkins in the "Maritime Strategy Supplement," outlined the three phases of the FMS to be conducted in a campaign against the Soviets. The first phase, *Deterrence or the Transition to War*, called for American forces, after Presidential authorization for mobilization, to surge to forward positions to act as deterrence forces, or if deterrence failed, to be in place for the transition to war. The second phase, *Seizing the Initiative*, was to be an aggressive anti-surface and anti-submarine warfare phase to gain control of the operational area and allow unrestricted use by Allied forces. The third phase has been discussed briefly above in reference to the "Anti-Bastion" strategy, but it also included conducting air strikes against key shore targets and conducting amphibious operations to secure

¹⁰⁸Refer to Lehman's "The 600 Ship Navy" and Watkins' "The Maritime Strategy," in the "Maritime Supplement."

¹⁰⁹The OP Plans and CONOPS are classified and therefore can not be quoted in this paper, but if the reader has the appropriate clearances, refer to OP Plans 2000 and 2200, Commander Striking Fleet Concept of Operations, and CINCPACFLT Concept of Operations.

vital military terrain (i.e.; airfields, port facilities, rail centers, communications centers, etc.)

The underlying principles of the Atlantic Maritime Strategy can be outlined as:

1. To contain and destroy the Soviet Northern Fleet.
2. To deny the Soviets use of airfields in northern Norway.
3. To assist in the defense of northern Norway.
4. To prevent the Soviets from conducting amphibious operations against Norway.¹¹⁰

The FMS became the focal point for components of the U.S. Navy's planning and a programing policy. Having coherent objectives gave the logistical and force planners a benchmark for preparing programs that would meet strategic goals. It presented a clear Navy-Marine Corps perspective when testifying to Congress on defense matters and for budget request. Most importantly, it allowed for public debate on the strategy. The Navy had learned its lesson regarding secretive strategies vis-a-vis the maritime policy

¹¹⁰Kennedy-Minott, p. 13; attributed to Vice Admiral Henry C. Mustin, USN, ex-Commander of NATO Striking Fleet, at a conference sponsored by the Naval Institute, circa 1986, no reference given.

devised by Admiral Sherman in the late 1940s. The publication of the "Maritime Supplement" in Proceedings was a clear public statement of policy, calling for a "Joint" national defense policy based on the traditional might of America, its maritime strength. Admiral Trost's article in the same publication a year later, described the *Essence of the Maritime Strategy* as:

[dealing] with the forces we have at our disposal today. . . . it is a forward strategy, forward in the sense of meeting our treaty obligations and other commitments by operating away from our own shores. . . . [and] the strategy is operative worldwide.¹¹¹

The debate on the Maritime Strategy was not confined to the United States (or the Soviet Union). NATO member states and other members of the Western alliance debated the policy and its effects on their security and economies.¹¹² One of the legacies of the Carter Administration, the elevation of

¹¹¹ADM Carlisle A.H. Trost, "Looking Beyond the Maritime Strategy," Proceedings (January 1987), pp. 15-6.

¹¹²Good sources on the European debates include: John C. Ausland, Nordic Security and the Great Powers (Bolder, CO: Westview Press, 1986); R.A. Bitzinger, "Denmark, Norway, and NATO: Constraints and Challenges," Rand Corporation Note N-3001-RC, November 1989); and William J. Taylor and Paul M. Cole, ed., Nordic Defense: Comparative Decision Making. (Lexington, MA: Lexington Books, 1985). These are in addition to Berner; Jensen; Jervell and Kare; Kennedy-Minott; Jonsson; and Tunander, "Gray Zone".

U.S. commitment to Southwest Asia to the same level as it NATO commitment and the creation of RDJTF, caused concern over the America's determination to defend Europe in what was perceived as an upswing in the Cold-War rhetoric under Reagan.¹¹³ The deployment of SS-20 intermediate range missiles by the Soviets and the Reagan Administration's dual track policy for developing and deploying a U.S. counter, Pershing II and GLCMs, while at the same time seeking an arms control agreement banning them, caused political turmoil in Europe.¹¹⁴ The Maritime Strategy became a means to rally and unify NATO to a common programing and operational plan.

One of the biggest questions for the European members of NATO was what were the logistical and force requirements for

¹¹³Sherwood, pp. 150-160 and Komer, pp. 1125-8. Although the RDJTF had no troops assigned to it on a permanent basis, the Europeans (and the Japanese and Korean as well) feared that if troops were required, they would be pulled from NATO. Also, the decision to elevate the status of Southwest Asia must made unilaterally by the Carter Administration without consulting the NATO Council of Ministers (NCM). Reagan's strengthening the RDJTF to a Unified Command, U.S. Central Command (USCENTCOM), caused even more concern and the eventual South West Asia Impact Study (SWAIS) that lead to increased biannual force goals. Refer to Hartmann and Wendzel, pp. 259-60 for details of the budgetary and force requirements of RDJTF.

¹¹⁴Komer, p. 1126. Anti-nuclear and anti-U.S. rallies were common in European capitals during this period, putting additional strains on the Alliance.

the FMS? The force requirements were easier to address than were the logistical requirements. The Military Committee (MC) of NATO was able to develop operational requirements based on force levels as part of its Defense Planning Questionnaire (DPQ) and the development of the Tri-MC Maritime Document. The logistics problem proved harder to solve. First there was the question of what to stockpile? Although NATO had been an alliance for over thirty years, there is a great deal of diversity in equipment among the members. Even though the logistics train could follow the fleet, after the first days of the conflict, the expected consumption and attrition rates would quickly exhaust the onboard supplies and the long turn around times from the United States to the Northern Flank were unacceptable. Additionally, the logistics requirements for the Marine amphibious units (MAUs) and the other units that would be deployed required that supplies be prepositioned for quick use. This is the success story of the Strategy, for the alliance, in particularly the Norwegians and the British, despite contested domestic debates, rose to the occasion and developed a system of prepositioned stores and repair facilities to buttress the FMS.¹¹⁵

¹¹⁵Kennedy-Minott, 22, 26, and 41; Watkins' 9; and General P.X. Kelly, USMC, "The Amphibious Warfare Strategy,

D. SUMMARY

The FMS has been the foundation of Alliance policy since its general acceptance. It was generated from rediscovery and refinement of the principles of Mahan. Its post World War II evolution was rocky and tied to the political whims of the succeeding Administrations. That is an accepted fact of planning national and military policy in a democracy. It took an expanding Soviet foreign policy and naval presence to compel the civilian and military leadership into proactive planning. Along the way, many mistakes were made and many lessons were learned which were applied in forming the FMS.

The end of the Cold War however has brought the leadership back to redefining its strategic policy. The dissolution of Warsaw Pact alliance has removed the monolithic threat that has been the focus of our planning for forty five years and a freed Europe has brought with it its own set of problems that threaten the NATO Alliance. Third World petro-countries have established large standing militaries that are well equipped. The question to be asked now is: does the Navy's maritime strategy, as envisioned by

The Maritime Strategy Supplement," Proceedings (January 1986), p. 25.

its leadership, still provide guidance and basis for our current and future maritime strategy in the Atlantic? If it does not, then what lessons from the past can be applied in formulating a new strategy? The next chapter will look at the current discussion and planning that is taking place in Washington and in Europe regarding the future of the maritime strategy.

IV. THE NORTH ATLANTIC MARITIME STRATEGY

AFTER THE COLD WAR

A. THE END OF THE COLD WAR

When the Berlin Wall was torn down in November 1989, the most visible symbol of the Cold War period was destroyed.¹¹⁶ The Western world proclaimed the triumph of capitalism over Marxist-Leninist socialism, the victory of the free over the oppressed, and the victory of "containment" over Soviet expansionism.¹¹⁷

In light of changes in East-West relations, Soviet Minister of Defense, Army General Dmitri Yazov, addressed the shift in Soviet military planning to "reasonable sufficiency" stating that "in developing the theory and practice of the art of war, we are guided by the concept of a defensive strategy."¹¹⁸ The old, relatively stable, bi-polar international system has given way to a multi-polar

¹¹⁶Although the Demilitarized Zone (DMZ) in Korea remains, it has never been quite the symbol of U.S.-Soviet conflict as has been the Berlin Wall.

¹¹⁷Colin Gray, "Tomorrow's Forecast: Warmer/Still Cloudy," Proceedings/Naval Review (May 1990), p. 38; and Thomas B. Grassey, "The New Deterrence," Proceedings (June 1991), p. 32.

¹¹⁸As quoted in: Gray, "Tomorrow's Forecast," p. 38.

international system that, some analysts fear, will be less stable, at least for the foreseeable future.

The "Wall" had symbolized the East-West division at the core of military planning and spending for the superpowers and their Allies for over forty years. The supposedly monolithic Warsaw Pact Treaty Organization (WPTO) began to fall apart as one after another the East European "revolutions" of 1989 occurred.

The signing of the Conventional Forces Europe (CFE) treaty in November 1990 signals a radical structural arms reduction from the Atlantic to the Urals, with the WPTO accepting larger cuts than NATO.¹¹⁹ U.S. and West European military and civilian strategist have been forced to review their plans and policies regarding a confrontation with the Warsaw Pact in Europe. If intelligence experts are to be believed, the West will have up to two years of warning time concerning a "future Europe-centered global war with the

¹¹⁹The WPTO cuts are mainly Soviet cuts since the WPTO is no longer a military alliance. The asymmetrical cuts that the Soviet negotiators agreed to under CFE have been at the root of the military-right backlash in the Soviet Union and have threatened to postpone or negate U.S. Senate ratification of the treaty. For details on the treaty and the differences in interpretation see: Michael R. Gordon, "Outlook is Cloudy for an Arms Deal by U.S. and Soviets," New York Times, 6 February 1991, p. A1(W); and Andrew Rosenthal, "A U.S.-Soviet Arms Dispute is Approaching Resolution," New York Times, 23 May 1991, p. A8(W).

USSR."¹²⁰ Given a reduced Soviet threat in Europe, is there a need to continue stationing large, ready forces in Europe?

This question is particularly important to the U.S. Navy. The Navy had developed its "Maritime Strategy" of forward deploying forces close to the Soviet Union in times of crises as a means of deterring war. If deterrence failed, the Navy, acting unilaterally or in concert with its Allies (principally NATO), would conduct conventional maritime and amphibious operations on the Soviet flanks and strike Soviet SSBNs in the "Bastions." This "horizontal escalation" would presumably have forced the Soviets to protect their flanks, in turn would relieving pressure on the Central Front, long viewed as the key to any East-West conflict.¹²¹ The "600 ship navy" envisioned by ex-Secretary of the Navy John Lehman had been planned around this strategy and had provided a focus around which to center naval planning and budgeting for both the United States and its Allies.¹²² With the decrease in East-West tensions,

¹²⁰James J. Tritten, "America's New National Security Strategy," The Submarine Review (April 1991), p. 15.

¹²¹For details on U.S./NATO views of the Central Front's past importance, both militarily and politically see "The Maritime Strategy Supplement" Proceedings (January 1986), and Frederick H. Hartmann and Robert L. Wendzel, Defending America's Security, 2nd ed. (McClean, VA: Brassey's (US), Inc., 1990), pp. 278-84.

many leaders in Washington and Europe have called for a reassessment of the Western military posture.¹²³ The "Lehman Maritime Strategy," although successful for its time, is viewed as no longer valid in the new security regime.¹²⁴

The demise of the Lehman strategy leaves NATO members wondering what their security future holds. The Norwegians, more than anyone else, are aware of the vulnerable geostrategic position in which they find themselves. Much of Norway's defense planning depends on an U.S./NATO response in times of crisis.¹²⁵ Although CFE has reduced

¹²²Captain R.W. Barnet, "The Origin of the Maritime Strategy," two parts, Naval Forces X (No. IV 1989), pp. 52-57 and X (No. V 1989), pp. 58-62.; and Mearsheimer, "A Strategic Misstep," International Security (Fall 1986), pp. 3-57.

¹²³"Text of the London Declaration of July 1990." The Declaration calls for no first use of force by NATO and that NATO members "solemnly state that we are no longer adversaries and reaffirm our intention to refrain from the threat or use of force against the territorial integrity of any state..." (Paragraph 6). The London Declaration has become the guideline for restructuring NATO.

¹²⁴"Meeting the Challenges of a Dynamic World: Naval Policy for the 90's and Beyond," (A draft copy of brief to CNO/CINCs Conference, October 1990), slide 11, notes states: "The Maritime Strategy of the Cold War era is on the shelf and ready for use if a global (read Soviet) threat re-emerges." Also refer to Trost, "Maritime Strategy for the 1990s, 92; and Congress, House, Committee on Armed Services, statement by Admiral F.B. Kelso, II, USN, Chief of Naval Operations, Posture and Fiscal Year 1992/1993 Budget of the United States Navy, 102nd Cong., 21 February 1991, pp. 1-2.

tensions on the Central Front, the Norwegians are rightly concerned about the Soviet's continued buildup and modernization of forces on the Kola Peninsula.¹²⁶ There is increasing concern "over the expected reductions in the U.S. Navy, and a possible shift in USN emphasis from the North Atlantic to Third World contingencies."¹²⁷

B. UNITED STATES MILITARY STRATEGY FOR THE 1990S

When President Bush announced in a speech given at Aspen, Colorado, that 25 percent cuts in the military would occur by 1995, the world paid little attention. This would have been highly unusual for cuts of such magnitude, but the speech happened to coincide with the Iraqi invasion of Kuwait on 2 August 1990.¹²⁸ The announced cuts, stimulated

¹²⁶James Stark, "Norway," in Nordic Defense: Comparative Decision Making, ed. William J. Taylor, Jr. and Paul M. Cole, (Lexington MA: Lexington Books, 1985), pp. 91-126; Kennedy-Minott, pp. 24-33; and Grove, ed. NATO's Defense of the North.

¹²⁶Ian Kemp, ed., Albert Jonsson, John Berg, and Johan Rapp, contrib., "Politics of Change," Jane's Defense Weekly, Special Report: Nordic Appraisal, (30 March 1991), p. 489.

¹²⁷Ibid, p. 480; and Rear Admiral Rolf E. Pedersen, Royal Norwegian Navy, "Norway's Coast is Clear," Proceedings (March 1991), pp. 42-7.

¹²⁸Refer to: Maureen Dowd, "Backing Pentagon, Bush Says Military Can Be Cut 25% in 5 Years," New York Times, 3 August 1990, p. A13(W); Dan Balz, "Bush Sees 25% Cut in Forces by 1995," Washington Post, 3 August 1990, p. A7; and

by pressure from Congress to produce a "Peace Dividend," came after a year long internal Pentagon review of force requirements conducted by General Colin Powell, chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, and Paul Wolfowitz, Under Secretary of Defense for Policy.¹²⁹

The plan calls for a new "slimmed down" defense strategy based on the "end of the Cold War" and two years warning time now believed available for indications of a resurgent Soviet Union.¹³⁰ Emphasis will shift towards responding to regional crises that are considered vital to U.S. interest. The new force structure envisioned is:

Army: 12 active, 2 reconstitutable reserve, and 6 other reserve divisions reduced from the current 18 active and 10 reserve divisions

Air Force: 25 active and reserve tactical air wings down for the current 36 total

Navy: 11-12 aircraft carriers down from 14 active

George Bush, "Remarks by the President to the Aspen Institute Symposium," Aspen, Colorado, 2 August 1990 (The White House: Office of the Press Secretary).

¹²⁹Michael R. Gordon, "New Pentagon Strategic Plan For a World After Cold War"; "Despite War, Pentagon Plans Big Cuts," and "Despite Pentagon Blueprint, Questions on Spending Remain," New York Times, 2 August 1990, 3 February and 5 February 1991, pp. A1(W), A4(W) and A10(W).

¹³⁰Ibid.

Marine Corps: 150,000 personnel down from 196,000

As part of the planned reduction, overseas and U.S. basing would be reduced by closing or realigning facilities.¹³¹

The pillars of the realigned structure are identified as: continued modernization of our strategic forces; an emphasis on research and development (R&D) to maintain the United States technological edge; a focus on rapid response capability; a premium on readiness and new roles for the reserves; and a reconstitution policy to counter the possibility of a renewed threat from the Soviets.¹³²

Secretary of Defense Cheney and others in the Pentagon leadership have spelled out the goal of a smaller military before numerous audiences, and spending cuts have been incorporated into the 1992 defense budget request.¹³³ The

¹³¹Gordon, 2 August 1990. These numbers have changed somewhat since the war and are sure to change again, but they are a good approximation. For other figures see the 3 February article which notes among other figures; 451 ships for the Navy and 26.5 air wings for the Air Force.

¹³²See Bush's Aspen Speech.

¹³³Refer to: Dick Cheney, "Remarks as Delivered by Secretary of Defense Dick Cheney, International Institute for Strategic Studies," The Homestead, Hot Springs, VA, 6 September 1990, and "Remarks By Secretary of Defense Dick Cheney at Walsh Lecture," Georgetown University, Washington, D.C., 21 March 1991, (Washington, D.C.: Office of Assistant

services have responded and have started developing budgets and plans based on the reductions.¹³⁴

A realignment of the Unified Command structure is seen as one of the outcomes of the overall Defense Department realignment. Although not firmly agreed to yet, the future command structure as outlined by Pentagon spokesmen and reported in the press calls for four major force commands; an Atlantic Force, a Pacific Force, a Strategic Force, and a Contingency Force. These will be supported with four additional components; transportation, space, research and development, and reconstitution.¹³⁵

The Atlantic Force has been described as primarily a heavy lift force capable of reacting to crises in Europe and

Secretary of Defense(Public Affairs); Colin Powell, "Remarks by General Colin Powell, Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff," at the National Convention of the Veterans of Foreign Wars, Baltimore, MD, 23 August 1990 (Washington, D.C.: Joint Chiefs of Staff (Public Affairs); and George L. Butler, "Speech by Director, Plans and Policy Directorate, Joint Staff, to the Center for Defense Journalism," the National Press Club, Washington, D.C., 27 September 1990 (Washington, D.C.: Joint Chiefs of Staff (Public Affairs)).

¹³⁴Refer to: Lawrence Garrett III, Frank B. Kelso, and A.M. Gray, "The Way Ahead," Proceedings (April 1991), pp. 36-47; Carl E. Vuono, A Strategic Force for the 1990s and Beyond (Washington, D.C.: Office of the Chief of Staff, U.S. Army); and "The Air Force and U.S. National Security: Global Reach - Global Power," A White Paper dated June 1990.

¹³⁵Michael R. Gordon, 2 August 1990; Navy Times, p. A18(W); and author's notes taken during "Admiral Charles M. Cooke Conference-1991," Naval Postgraduate School, Monterey, CA, 5-7 March 1991.

the Middle East. Army units will include five active divisions with two stationed in Europe, six reserve divisions, and two "reconstitutable" divisions. Air Force units will consist of five - six tactical fighter wings with three - four wings stationed in Europe. The Navy will have six carriers in the Atlantic command with one deployed to the Mediterranean and the remainder of the force will comprise of the historic even split of naval forces.¹³⁶ The Atlantic Force's heavy forces makeup reflects a persistent U.S. concern about the future of Europe.

There has been an abundance of discussion regarding the "new strategy," with many academics and strategist claiming that it is not built on firm strategic foundations, but on budgetary pressures. Some writers have gone as far as saying that the Bush Administration lacks an orchestrated policy.¹³⁷ In the confused aftermath of the Cold War, the political leadership has shirked its responsibilities for providing clear guidance for our country's future. Although

¹³⁶Ibid.

¹³⁷Michael Mandelbaum, "The Bush Foreign Policy," Foreign Affairs, Vol. 70, No. 1, 1991, pp. 5-22; B. Thomas Trout, "Changing Scenarios of Naval Force: The International Political Context of Maritime Power," paper prepared for delivery at the annual meeting of the International Studies Association, Vancouver, B.C., 20 March 1991; and Grassey, 33.

such accusations might seem harsh given the difficulties of changing forty years of bureaucratic inertia, they do point to the need for a comprehensive review of the United States' national interest and goals. Without an overarching "grand strategy" that takes into consideration secondary and beyond consequences of that strategy, it becomes virtually pointless to plan lesser strategies; but, that is what the Navy finds itself doing.

Another weakness of the new strategy that has received criticism is the "reconstitution" of forces. Critics point out that with the reduction in defense spending, the industrial base that supported America's Cold War strategy will have to be reduced. Industries such as shipbuilding, tank manufacturing, and aircraft production will have to shut down production lines or facilities that are no longer profitable unless the government is willing to provide subsidies.¹³⁸

¹³⁸Tritten; Edward J. Campbell, "Industrial Base," and James E. Turner, "Maintaining the U.S. Submarine Industrial Base," Submarine Review (April 1991), pp. 27-31 and pp. 32-36.

C. U.S. NAVAL STRATEGY FOR THE 1990s

The U.S. Navy finds itself in a position much like that of the immediate post World War II era. In this case however, the opponent's military strength is still intact. The "Lehman Maritime Strategy" that defined naval missions for the 1980s, no longer carries the day when Congress is lobbied for Navy's share of the budget despite testimony presented by the Director of Naval Intelligence (DNI) on the continuing modernization of the Soviet Navy.¹³⁹

Given the guidelines laid out by the Secretary of Defense, Navy leadership has scrambled to develop a post Lehman strategy. "The Way Ahead" article published in U.S. Naval Institute Proceeding, April 1991, is an unclassified articulation of the Navy's "new strategy." Authored by the Secretary of the Navy, the Chief of Naval Operations, and the Commandant of the Marine Corps, it uses the President's Aspen Speech outline for future U.S. defense policy and DNI's assessment of future threats as benchmarks to match Navy's missions to policy. The needed force structure, still centered on the carrier battle group, is defined as a

¹³⁹Congress, House, Committee on Intelligence Issues, subcommittee on Seapower, Strategic, and Critical Materials, Statement(s) of Rear Admiral Thomas A. Brooks, USN, Director of Naval Intelligence, 101st Cong., 1st Sess., 22 February 1989; 101st Cong., 2nd Sess., 14 March 1990, and 102nd Cong., 1st Sess., 7 March 1991.

"balanced total force of about 450 active and reserve ships, plus three active and one reserve Marine division/wing team (Marine expeditionary forces)."¹⁴⁰ The goals outlined in the article are not new to naval professionals and show their heritage from the Lehman strategy. This should not be a surprise, since the "Maritime Strategy" was meant to be an evolving strategy.

According to an article by John F. Morton, in the 1991 Proceedings/Naval Review:

Four key components of the new naval policy are shaping the current wave of reductions -- surge forces for rapid reaction to any crisis, forward-deployed expeditionary forces capable of going anywhere (with full logistic, medical, and repair support), a sea-based maritime pre-positioned force, and sea-based strategic forces for deterrence.¹⁴¹

The one glaring shift in the new strategy is the statement by Secretary Garrett in his 1992-93 Congressional policy statement that anti-submarine warfare is "no longer the Navy's number warfighting priority."¹⁴² The emphasis is now placed on power projection and control of the SLOCs to

¹⁴⁰Garrett, p. 45.

¹⁴¹John F. Morton, "The Navy in 1990," Proceedings/Naval Review (May 1991), p. 124.

¹⁴²Ibid.

deal with regional contingencies.¹⁴³ The power projection role will require a ready and robust Navy-Marine team, as exemplified by Operations Desert Shield/Desert Storm. The rapid response by Navy and Marine forces in early August is credited with deterring the Iraqi Army from invading Saudi Arabia.¹⁴⁴

Overseas basing and overflights are of increasing concern for the Navy. The new strategy stresses "forward presence" as a deterring factor and that without adequate forward basing, the strategy is without teeth. United States access to foreign basing has been steadily declining and must be reversed.¹⁴⁵ The new strategy also requires changes in the employment and deployment of naval forces. Given the reduced numbers of naval vessels available in the next decade, and the possibility of growing regional threats to U.S. interest, innovative mixes of forces will be required to meet these contingencies. The key to solving many of these problems rest in maintaining and building new sets of alliances.

¹⁴³Author's notes from "Cooke Conference-1991;" and Morton, p. 125.

¹⁴⁴Eric Schmitt, "Swarzkopf Praises Navy, and Teamwork, for Gulf Role," New York Times, 31 May 1991, p. A16(W).

¹⁴⁵See James L. George, "A Strategy in the Navy's Best Interest," Proceedings/Naval Review, (May 1991), p. 118.

D. EUROPE'S ROLE IN THE NEW STRATEGY

On October 3, 1990, the same day Germany was united, General John Galvin, Supreme Allied Commander, Europe (SACEUR), "rescinded the General Defense Plan, NATO Document 14/3, the Western mobilization plans to meet a surprise attack from the East."¹⁴⁶ With the agreement worked out at the "Four plus Two" talks on the unification of Germany, and the July 1990 London Conference, the old East-West demarcation line centered on the Fulda Gap, ceased to exist. The future of NATO's role in European security began to be questioned.

One of the results of the London Conference is the restructuring of the NATO alliance. At the NATO ministerial meeting held in Brussels, the week of 27 May 1991, a streamlined NATO force was announced. As reported in the New York Times, 29 May 1991, the new NATO will "prepare for small crises instead of [a WPTO] assault from the East," and U.S. force levels will be reduced by 50 percent by the end

¹⁴⁶"NATO Still Split on Future Doctrine, Threat," Der Spiegel, p. 15 October 1990), trans. FBIS-WEU-90-218, (9 November 1990), p. 1. The article goes on to discuss the end of NATO's Flexible Response policy and the need to revamp Europe's security needs.

of the decade.¹⁴⁷ Forces will be centered on a "Rapid Reaction Force" that could respond in 5-7 days and will include multinational troops.¹⁴⁸

Western European nations have been discussing the need for a change to the Alliance for some time, calling for a new European security framework.¹⁴⁹ The 35 member Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe (CSCE), established in 1975, has been discussed as a possible forum for addressing European security concerns. Its advantage is that it already includes both the United States and Canada as members. Critics of the CSCE proposal point out that the size of the Conference is its weakness, pointing to the difficulties NATO's sixteen members have had in reaching agreement on defense issues.¹⁵⁰ Additionally, each member

¹⁴⁷Paul L. Montgomery, "NATO is Planning to Cut U.S. Forces in Europe by 50%," New York Times, 29 May 1991, p. A1(W).

¹⁴⁸Ibid.

¹⁴⁹Refer to: Grassey, p. 32; Peter Stanford, "NATO Must Go," Proceedings (March 1991), pp. 36-40; Johan Jorgen Holst, "Changing Northern European Views on Security and Arms Control," Naval War College Review (Spring 1990), pp. 85-103; "Norway's Security in a New Era," Norwegian Defense Review, Status of Norwegian Defense 1991 (Special Issue), pp. 6-11; and Francis West (former U.S. Assistant Secretary of Defense) as quoted in Ola Tunander, Cold Water Politics, pp. 47-49.

¹⁵⁰Stanford, p. 39. and Holst, "Status of Norwegian Defense."

of the Conference has one equal vote. This is a weakness that stronger member nations, such as the United States object.¹⁵¹

Another alliance that has been discussed as the foundation from which to build a European security arrangement is the West European Union (WEU) under whose umbrella a multinational task force operated in the Arabian Gulf in 1988 and 1991.¹⁵² The WEU was established in 1954 as a European security union separate from NATO and it has "provided essential political cover" for members to conduct out of area military operations.¹⁵³ The WEU has the support of France. Its major strength is that members are not prevented from conducting out of area operations in support of European interest as is NATO. Its major draw back is that it does not include the United States or Canada in the alliance.

It appears, for the time being, that a "revamped" NATO will be the alliance that will oversee Atlantic security interest through the decade of the 1990s. The French-German initiative to form a European security arrangement seems to

¹⁵¹Stanford, p. 39.

¹⁵²Sherwood, pp. 150-160; and Stanford, pp. 39-40.

¹⁵³Ibid, p. 182.

on hold for now, but the question of French involvement in a common European security agreement remains and must be resolved.¹⁵⁴

The Brussels Ministerial meeting of May 1991 dealt mainly with revision of land based components of NATO's force structure. Little was reported in the press concerning NATO's maritime component. Two possible explanations exist regarding this oversight. One, it was just an oversight; that NATO, in the public eye, as been viewed as a continental alliance of mainly land based forces and that the proposed 50 percent reduction is across the board, or two, no firm plans exist for restructuring NATO's maritime forces. Hopefully, the latter explanation is incorrect.

Supreme Allied Commander, Atlantic (SACLANT), Admiral L.A. Edney, in a presentation to a closed session of NATO's Military Committee (MC) 11-12 April 1991, detailed a new maritime structure that is based on guidelines of the London Conference.¹⁵⁵ It calls for developing two core

¹⁵⁴Montgomery. The article notes the attempt by France, with German support, pushed for a new security structure to replace NATO.

¹⁵⁵Memorandum for Facsimile titled, "Tri-NMC Concepts and Rationale for Future Maritime Force Structures," dated 1 April 1991, (Norfolk, VA: Headquarters, Supreme Allied Commander, Atlantic); compiled from notes taken by author

Multinational Maritime Forces (MNMF) that are akin to Standing Naval Forces Atlantic (SNFL) with one in the Mediterranean and one in the Atlantic.¹⁵⁶ Its maritime tasks, as outlined by SACLANT, are consistent with the policy outlined by Secretary Garrett in "The Way Ahead" article:

- Presence; to promote stability, deter, and exercise forces
- Surveillance
- Sea Control
- SLOC protection
- Power Projection
 1. Support the Air/Land Battle
 2. Reinforce existing forces ashore
 3. Establish a beachhead on hostile shores

during SACLANT interview with Captain. Fitch, USN, (C-72), 10 April 1991.

¹⁵⁶The MNMF is envisioned as being a staged force structure consisting of three forces. First: **Reaction Forces**, subdivided into *Immediate Reaction Forces* responding in less than 48 hours comprised of Destroyers (DD), Frigates (FF), Ocean Mine Sweepers (MSO) and Mine Counter Measures (MCM) vessels as well as support units; and *Rapid Reaction Forces* responding in less than 96 hours, subdivided into: *NATO Task Groups* (NTGS) comprised of Cruisers (CG), DDs, FFs, MSOs, MCMs, and submarines, both nuclear and conventional (SSN/Ks); and *NATO Task Forces* (NTFS) comprised of a NTGS plus a carrier battle group (CVBG) augmented by a Marine Amphibious Group (MAG) if required; and a NATO Expanded Task Force (NETFS) comprised of a NTFS plus a full amphibious landing force. The second force is the **Main Defense Maritime Force** which mirrors the NETFS. It would respond within 15-30 days and be use in the most severe crisis level short of full mobilization. The third force would be **Augmentation Forces** which would comprise of vessels that could not be activated in less than 30 days, but could be used in a prolonged crisis. Compiled from author's SACLANT notes.

4. Provide a base for further operations if required
- Humanitarian Assistance/Disaster Relief
- Provide a base for further operations if required¹⁵⁷

Although the readiness of the force structure has changed, reflecting relaxed East-West tensions and increased warning times, the "revamped" goals appear to be much like those of the "old" Tri-NATO Major Command (Tri-NMC) Concept of Maritime Operations (CONMAROPS), NATO's version of the Lehman strategy.¹⁵⁸ CONMAROPS is still in effect for NATO warfighting as of this writing, but like the Lehman maritime strategy, is considered unlikely to be used, and "on the shelf."¹⁵⁹

The concept outlined by Admiral Edney presupposes that the naval forces of NATO will be reduced, but that all members will adopt "reconstitution" policies akin to those of the United States.¹⁶⁰ This is understood to mean that active force levels will remain sufficient to meet the operational requirements of NATO. Previous discussion has

¹⁵⁷SACLANT facsimile.

¹⁵⁸Grove, NATO's Defense of the North, pp. 4-6. Grove provides an UNCLAS overview of the Tri-NMC CONMAROPS.

¹⁵⁹Fitch SACLANT interview, 10 April 1991.

¹⁶⁰Ibid.

shown that there is considerable concern in the United States about the ability to reconstitute forces given the current budget problems. As will be seen, there exist some serious concerns about the ability of NATO's Northern European members, Norway and Denmark, to sustain forces. This problem also extends to non-members, Sweden and Finland, and increases concern over the future security of NATO's Northern Flank.

E. THE UNCERTAIN FUTURE OF SCANDINAVIA'S ABILITY TO CONTRIBUTE TO ITS DEFENSE

As the decade of the 1990s progresses, the ability of the Scandinavian countries to contribute to the defense of the region will increasingly come into question. Due to budgetary difficulties, peace initiatives, arms control proposals, etc., these nations will have to reevaluate their defense policies and, in most cases, reduce the capabilities and/or size of their armed forces.¹⁶¹

Iceland is perhaps the least affected at this point by the changes that have taken place in past few years. Since it does not maintain a military force, questions concerning

¹⁶¹Numerous articles in the Scandinavian and U.S. press have been appeared in the past several years discussing the future ability of the region to provide for its security needs. For a general overview refer to the following: Johan J. Holst, "Changing Northern European Views on Security and Arms Control," and Count Wilhelm Wachtmeister, "Neutrality and International Order," Naval War College Review (Spring 1990), pp. 85-114; Rear Admiral Rolf E. Pedersen, Royal Norwegian Navy, "Norway's Coast is Clear," and Rear Admiral Claes Tornberg, Royal Swedish Navy, "Meeting the Submarine Threat," Proceedings (March 1991), pp. 42-50; Commodore I. Olav Kjetun, "Is There a Place for the Coastal Artillery in Our Future Invasion Defense?" Norsk Artilleri-Tidsskrift (No.2, 1988), trans. FBIS-WEU-89-007, 11 January 1989, pp. 43-7; Werner Christie, "Nordic Countries Between the Superpowers," Aftenposten, 15 December 1988, p. 14, trans. FBIS-WEU-89-031, 16 February 1989, p. 29; Olav Storvik, "Holst: Army a Reform Problem," and Unattributed report: "Holst: Defense Growth is Good!" Aftenposten, 28 February 1989, p. 4, and 7 March 1989, p. 8, trans. FBIS-WEU-89-079, 26 April 1989, pp. 21-2; editorial, "A Defense Compromise," and Terkel Svensson, "Defense Bill Point by Point," Berlinske Tidende, 9 March 1989, p. 12, and 10 March 1989, p. 4, trans. FBIS-WEU-89-069, 12 April 1989.

military budgets are confined to civil defense and NATO construction projects that take place in Iceland.¹⁶² Iceland however, does have much at stake with regard to its security future. It depends almost entirely on the United States for its military security.¹⁶³ The decrease in Soviet naval and air activity (See Table 4) since the late 1980s has caused the United States to take a close look at its force structure there.¹⁶⁴ SACLANT has dropped its proposal for establishment of an alternate airfield in Iceland although a one billion dollar NATO infrastructure modernization and building program has continued as planned.¹⁶⁵

¹⁶²Jonsson, Iceland and the Keflavik Base, pp. 13-18.

¹⁶³The Netherlands maintains 1 aircraft detachment at Keflavik and other NATO countries periodically send detachments, but the bulk of the Iceland Defense Force is American.

¹⁶⁴The U.S. Navy is exploring the possibility of reducing the size of the P-3 force stationed in Iceland. An internal decision made in 1989, reduced the size of the squadron deployed there to 8 aircraft vice the 9 that had been the norm. There exist the possibility that by late 1991-early 1992, Keflavik might become "Split deployment site" with half of a P-3 squadron deployed there and the other half deployed to Lajes, the Azores. (Information from author's interview with Captain Jim Arnold, Commander Task Force 84, Air ASW shop, Norfolk, VA, 9 April 1991.)

¹⁶⁵Jonsson, Jane's Defense Weekly, pp. 495-8.




CHART 1: NUMBERS OF SOVIET AIRCRAFT INTERCEPTED IN THE ICELANDIC MILITARY AIR DEFENSE IDENTIFICATION ZONE (IMADIZ) 1985-1990. (Sources: Albert Jonsson, Iceland NATO and the Keflavik Base, 54 and Jane's Defence Weekly, Nordic Appraisal, (30 March 1991), 495.)

Regardless of the changes that have taken place in East-West relations, Iceland will continue to play a vital role in the defense and reinforcement of Northern Europe. For the time being at least, Iceland's main concern is to maintain a U.S. presence on the island through strong bilateral relations.¹⁶⁶

¹⁶⁶Ibid, p. 494. Jonsson sees Iceland's role growing as U.S. troop strength in Europe is reduced; and in Iceland and the Keflavik Base, p. 100, states: "Defending Norway could not be counted on without forces in Iceland."

Denmark's military future is less certain than Iceland's. In March 1989, after months of debate, the national assembly, the Folketing, reached a compromise on a three year defense budget. The bill proposed a zero growth rate, adjusted for inflation, and appropriations that included three percent per year NATO infrastructure funding.¹⁶⁷ Under the bill, the Army's tank force would be upgraded by purchasing used Leopard tanks from Germany, modernizing some of their older tanks, and retiring others. The Navy planned to get four additional "Standard Flex" ships, modernization of two of their submarines, and scrapping of the remaining frigates. The latter's firepower will be replaced by two landbased surface-to-surface missile batteries to protect the vital Danish straits (the Skagerrak and the Kattegat). Additionally, a shipyard would be closed, and Copenhagen Naval Station changed from a homeport to a port of call. The Danish Air Force is to acquire ammunition and electronic identification equipment worth 600 million Danish Kroner (\$0.78 million in 1989 dollars). The unused military facilities are to be sold and the money acquired used for further defense spending.¹⁶⁸ The loss of

¹⁶⁷Terkel Svensson, "Defense Bill Point by Point," Berlingske Tidende, 10 March 1989, p. 4, trans. FBIS-WEU-89-069, 12 April 1989, pp. 13-14.

the shipyard at Holmen is a blow for both Denmark's and NATO's ability to accomplish battle damage repair in the Baltic.

NATO/U.S. access to bases in Greenland has been reduced with the decision to shutdown the DEW Line station at Sonder Stromfjord in southern Greenland.¹⁶⁹ Areas of Greenland's east coast were considered for the alternate North Atlantic airfield, but as already pointed out, SACLANT decided not to pursue construction. This leaves Thule as the only military base on the island and its future is in question. There is strong political pressure by the Greenlanders to establish a "nuclear free zone" in Greenland and U.S. evacuation of Thule.¹⁷⁰ There is also a strong independence movement in Greenland.

Sweden, long the premier military power in the Nordic region, is facing formidable security problems due to severe economic problems.¹⁷¹ The 1992 defense budget has been

¹⁶⁹Ibid. Under Danish law, the military buys from the government and when surplus or salvaged property is sold by the military, the funds raised are military funds.

¹⁶⁹Unattributed article: "Announcement: Bigger Danish Role in Greenland's Defense and U.S. Base Cuts?" Gronlandsposten, 21 November 1988, p. 10, trans. FBIS-WEU-89-015, 25 January 1989, pp. 33-4.

¹⁷⁰Ibid and Editorial, "Military Bases," Gronlandsposten, 4 November 1988, p. 8, trans. FBIS-WEU-89-015, 25 January 1989, p. 33.

lowered by 0.3 billion Swedish Kroner from the 1991 budget (approximately \$0.2 billion in 1989 dollars).¹⁷² As a result, "the military has said that either Sweden's defence goals must be redefined or the armed forces substantially modernized."¹⁷³

The Swedish Air Force desperately needs a new interceptor to replace its aging fighter fleet. Swedish air power in the 1950s and 1960s "was about the same size and strength as that of Great Britain, France, and West Germany," but has been in steady decline since then.¹⁷⁴ The JAS 39 Gripen fighter program has been beset by cost overruns and delays as well as heated debate in the national assembly about Sweden's overtaxing itself on the project.¹⁷⁵ The Gripen is needed to counter the latest generation of

¹⁷¹Jane's Defense Weekly: Nordic Appraisal, pp. 491-3; Dick Ljungberg, "Greens Criticize Defense Policy, Saying 'Vulnerability is Only Increasing,'" and Goran Schuck, "Schori Warns Of Weak Defense," Dagens Nyheter, 9 December 1988, p. 17, and 30 January 1989, p. 2, trans. FBIS-WEU-89-053(Supplement), 21 March 1989, p. 97.

¹⁷²Jane's Defense Weekly: Nordic Appraisal, p. 493.

¹⁷³Ibid, p. 491.

¹⁷⁴Wilhelm Agrell, "Trovardigheten raseras" [Credibility is Undetermined], Ny Teknik (Stockholm), 25 August 1988, as quoted in Tunander, Cold Water Politics, p. 125.

¹⁷⁵Werner Christie, "Nordic Countries Between the Superpowers," Aftenposten, 15 December 1988, p. 14, trans. FBIS-WEU-89-031, 16 February 1989, p. 29-30.

Soviet tactical aircraft which can reach all parts of Sweden without refueling and with very little advanced warning if coming from the Baltic, and the Soviet Union's newest helicopters can also reach most of the country unrefueled, thus increasing Sweden's vulnerability to airborne invasion threats from the East.¹⁷⁶

Submarine sightings in Swedish territorial waters have continued despite reduced superpower tensions.¹⁷⁷ Swedish naval and political officials have been frustrated over the failure to halt these excursions into "sensitive areas."¹⁷⁸ The Swedes have established a "submarine hunting force" in an attempt to address the issue and have begun development of "CAPTOR" [encapsulated torpedo] type mines as a counter.¹⁷⁹ The Swedish submarine force, perhaps the best

¹⁷⁶Ibid.

¹⁷⁷Refer to Tornberg article in Proceedings. Rear Admiral Tornberg admits that Sweden's ASW forces have not preformed well, citing the difficulties of conducting these operations in the Baltic and in shallow water, but says Sweden is intensifying its R&D efforts and that the rules of engagement have be relaxed to allow a more aggressive hunt.

¹⁷⁸Ibid, and Rodger Magnergard, "Foreign Submarine in the Inner Archipelago for Over a Week," Svenska Dagbladet, 5 February 1989, p. 6, trans. FBIS-WEU-89-028, 13 February 1989, p. 17. Tunander, in Cold Water Politics, p. 119, cites Milton Leitenberg and Gordon McCormick as believing that the Swedes have "more or less consciously let Soviet submarines escape" to avoid another international incident.

¹⁷⁹Ibid, and Rear Admiral Tornberg, p. 49.

ASW weapon system available, has decreased in size. Its fleet of six Type 90 SSKs has been reduced to only three.¹⁸⁰

The Swedish Army has reduced its size from 28 brigades to 21 over recent years as a means to reduce military expenditures. This level is the minimum considered necessary by Swedish Ministry of Defense (MOD) officials to carry out the current defense plan which has shifted away from a prolonged defense of the country to an anti-invasion force with its main strength along the Baltic coast.¹⁸¹ Given the geography of northern Sweden and present funding difficulties, this probably makes good defensive sense for Sweden, but it reduces the security of the area closest to Norway, further shifting the military balance of the region in favor of the Soviet Union.

Manpower in the Swedish armed forces is suffering from the same budgetary problems. This will be further aggravated by a MOD proposal to reduce conscript training from 10 months to 2.5 months. The Swedish parliament, believing that national service is a requirement for living in a democracy, compromised and limited initial service for some conscripts to 5 months.¹⁸² Some military leaders

¹⁸⁰Tornberg, p. 50.

¹⁸¹Jane's Defense Weekly: Nordic Appraisal, pp. 492-3.

question the shortened length of service, believing that its is not long enough to adequately acquire the skills necessary for modern warfare.¹⁸³ The requirement for conscript crew changes in the 1988 submarine hunt is cited by Swedish Navy official as one of the reasons for its failure.¹⁸⁴

The Swedish arms industry is suffering as well. Most of the Swedish military's equipment is domestically produced. As already discussed, the JAS 39 project has proven to be very costly. Designing and manufacturing modern combat aircraft is very expensive. This is one of the reasons that the European members of NATO have produced multinational fighters such as the Tornado and the Jaguar, to spread the research and development and manufacturing cost. This may point to the future of Sweden's aircraft industry if an export market can not be found for its designs. However, Sweden's restrictive arms export laws will hinder sales efforts on aircraft and other armaments.¹⁸⁵

¹⁸²Ibid, p. 493.

¹⁸³Ibid.

¹⁸⁴See untitled article by Bengt Flakkloo in Dagens Nyheter, 3 February 1989, p. 12, trans. FBIS-WEU-89-035, 23 February 1989, p. 54.

¹⁸⁵In 1987, seven Western powers, lead by the United States, joined together to halt sales of high technology equipment and chemical that could be used to produce mass

Finland is in the process of reassessing its defense posture. The Four plus Two agreement that restored full sovereignty to Germany is seen by many in Finland as the opportunity for rescinding the terms of the 1947 Paris Treaty, which placed limits on the armed forces and conceded Karelia to the Soviet Union, as well as the YYA [Friendship, Cooperation, and Mutual Assistance Treaty] with the Soviet Union are no longer valid.¹⁸⁶ This perhaps signals the beginning of a "less neutral" relationship with the West than was possible earlier.

Finnish defense spending has been quite low in the past, approximately 1.5 percent of the GNP.¹⁸⁷ Future defense spending has been much debated in the national assembly.

destruction weapons. These countries applied political pressure on the Swedish government to tighten up its export laws. Refer to untitled article by Bo G. Andersson, in Dagens Nyheter, 17 February 1989. trans. FBIS-WEU-89-053 (Supplement), 21 March 1989, p. 101.

¹⁸⁶Refer to Editorial, "Finland Reaps Harvest, Too," and unattributed article "Jakobson Would Let YYA[Friendship, Cooperation, and Mutual Assistance Treaty] Be; Karelia Comes Up in Discussion Again," Helsingin Sanomat, 22 September 1990, p. 2 and p. 9, trans. FBIS-WEU-90-213, 2 November 1990, p. 26.

¹⁸⁷Matti Klimola, "Is Finland Becoming a Model for Disarmament for Europe?; 10-Billion-Markka Fighter Plane Proposal Opens Debate on National Defense," Helsingin Sanomat, 15 January 1989, pp. B1-B2, trans. FBIS-WEU-89-053 (Supplement), 21 March 1989, p. 61. This figure varies between 1.5% to around 5.0% depending on who's figure one wants to believe. In the same article, these figures were also quoted.

Finnish Air Force officials would like to replace aging Draken and MiG-21 aircraft with newer generation aircraft of Soviet, Swedish or French design by the mid-1990s at an estimate cost of 6-9 million markkas(\$1.3-\$2.0 billion in 1989 dollars), but they face tough opposition for funding.¹⁸⁸

Norway, like the other Scandinavian countries, has had to face budgetary problems that have effected the military. Norway, however, is caught in a geostrategic bind between the superpowers. The present government in power supports Norway's role in NATO and recognizes its important geographic position. It also is concerned about the continuing Soviet military buildup on the Kola peninsula despite the apparent East-West thaw. Minister of Defense Johan Holst recently expressed concern over the Soviet Union's "redesignation" of the 77th Guards Motor Rifle Division in Archangelsk to a "coastal defense unit," in what is interpreted as a violation of the spirit of CFE.¹⁸⁹ Politicians are beginning to have second thoughts about the 1991 "zero

¹⁸⁸Unattributed article, "Harri Holkeri Wants Combat Fighter Equipment Replaced Despite Price; Valtanen Angered by Talk of Armament," Helsingin Sanomat, 17 January 1989, p. 13, trans. FBIS-WEU-89-53 (Supplement), 21 March 1989, p. 64.

¹⁸⁹Jane's Defense Weekly: Nordic Appraisal, p. 480.

growth" defense budget, and the Conservative Party, which introduced the proposal while in power, has called for the Labor Party to reinstate the 3 percent growth budget that had been in place earlier.¹⁹⁰

The Norwegian Army, the most powerful of the three services, will be slightly reduced in numbers of tanks and artillery to meet CFE requirements, but will modernize its remaining units. It is also facing manpower cuts as a result of the "zero growth" budget and will have to disband or combine some of its forces. According to Admiral Torolf Rein, Norway's Chief of Defense:

. . . last year's levels of refresher training for army mobilization (wartime) units, ship availability in the navy, flying hours in the air force and Home Guard exercises will be maintained. These activities are already considered to be at the minimum level for effective operations and reductions will be avoided by transferring funds freed by a limited cut in some readiness measures, cuts in initial military service and streamlining training. Norway's surveillance and warning capabilities will not be reduced.¹⁹¹

The Norwegian Air Force is presently in good shape by domestic accounts. The upgrading in the 1980s with F-16 fighter aircraft, the recent replacement of its P-3B

¹⁹⁰Ibid.

¹⁹¹Ibid.

maritime patrol aircraft with P-3C Update IVs, and the modernization of its helicopter fleet with Bell 412 SPs has maintained the service as a credible deterrent force.¹⁹² Current plans call for performing mid-life extension programs on the F-16s in the mid-1990s which will keep these aircraft functional well into the next decade, but the decline in Swedish airpower will place additional strains on Norway's air defenses.

The Norwegian Navy has also felt the effects of the budget squeeze. Motor torpedo boats (MTB) have had to be retired from service because of age and lack of funding.¹⁹³ This has spread the remaining MTBs thin, causing a reassignment of assets to cover strategic points in the north, but leaving weaker defenses in the south. Although Danish and German assets, if available, could quickly deploy to cover these areas, adequate warning time is essential. The loss of the MTBs is partially offset by construction of four new mine hunters and five new mine sweepers utilizing "surface effect" technology which will enhance Norway's vital NATO role of clearing inner passage SLOCs.¹⁹⁴

¹⁹²Ibid, p. 482.

¹⁹³Pedersen, p. 47. and an untitled article by Olav Trygge Storvik, Aftenposten, 15 December 1988, p. 4, trans. FBIS-WEU-89-023, 6 February 1989, pp. 42-3.

The Coastal Artillery, considered part of Norway's naval anti-invasion force, is in need of repair. Much of its equipment dates back to the Second World War and was installed by the German occupation forces. Repair of fixed gun emplacements has become impossible in some cases because of age and unavailability of parts.¹⁹⁵ Efforts to modernize the force with surface-to-surface missiles are meeting with limited success at this time.

Norway's recognition of its vital position between the superpowers has resulted in a defense force that is presently well equipped to handle its primary mission, anti-invasion, but the current "zero growth" defense spending will take its toll over the next few years. Hopefully, the end of the Cold War will allow Norway and the rest of Scandinavia to maintain a defense program that matches the "reduced" threat, but U.S. planners should be aware that, given the present circumstances, the defense and reconstitution capability of the region is questionable and must be considered in any calculus of the United States' reconstitution planning.

¹⁹⁴Jane's Defense Weekly: Nordic Appraisal, p. 487.

¹⁹⁵See Kjetun article.

**F. OTHER CURRENT ISSUES THAT MIGHT EFFECT NORDIC-U.S.-
U.S.S.R. RELATIONS**

In addition to the security and economic issues discussed so far, at least two other issues of importance face Scandinavia; its future relationship to the European Community; and the influx of refugees fleeing from the Baltic States and the Soviet Union as a result of the lift of travel restrictions in the Soviet Union. Perhaps the hardest question facing the Nordic countries is that of their future relationship to the European Community (EC). Currently Denmark is the only member. Sweden and Finland have both made overtures to join the Community. In Sweden's case, joining is seen as the means recover from its economic crisis. The EC is making plans to open an office in Helsinki in 1991, to better coordinate its ties with the Nordic countries. This has been viewed as an in-road to Finland's joining.¹⁹⁶ The issue of joining the EC has been hotly debated in Norway. The general view of Norwegian politicians had been that if Sweden asked to join, so would Norway. The Norwegian trade unions, and industry and commerce have expressed a general desire to join, but in the

¹⁹⁶Unattributed article, "EC Office in Finland May Open in 1991," Helsingin Sanomat, 30 August 1990, p. 11, trans. FBIS-WEU-90-213, 2 November 1990, p. 32. Finnish political leaders have tried to slow down joining EC, claiming the economic infrastructure needs time to adjust before joining.

past year, there has been a grass-roots backlash against Norway's joining.¹⁹⁷ Iceland's Althing has discussed joining, but is reluctant, fearing that its traditional fishing industry would suffer and the free immigration laws of EC would have an adverse effect on the Icelandic customs and lifestyle.¹⁹⁸

The political and security instability in the Baltic caused by the breakdown of the Soviet Empire and future lifting of travel restrictions in the Soviet Union are other factors that might cause an uncertain future for Scandinavia. It is somewhat ironic that the United State applied much of the political and economic pressure on the Soviets to allow free movement of Soviet citizens.¹⁹⁹ The "refugee problem" ties in with the question of membership in

¹⁹⁷Author's interview with Captain Hallin, Royal Norwegian Navy, Naval Attache, Norwegian Embassy, Washington, D.C., 11 April 1991. Norwegian farmers and fishermen view the joining of the EC as an end to their way of life. Also see: Tidningarnas Telegrambyra dispatch, "Norway Will Do as Sweden Does," Dagens Nyheter, 28 October 1990, p. 16, trans. FBIS-WEU-90-213; and Jane's Defense Weekly: Nordic Appraisal, p. 482.

¹⁹⁸Author's interview with LCDR Pam McNaught, USN, Assistant Department Head, OP-614, Pentagon, Washington, D.C., 11 April 1991.

¹⁹⁹Refer to Esther B. Fein, "Soviets Enact Law Freeing Migration and Trips Abroad," and R.W. Apple, Jr., "U.S. Lauds Moscow on Emigration Law," New York Times, 21 May 1991, p. A1(W) and p. A4(W).

the EC. When (if) "Europe '92" comes to fruition on December 31, 1992, there will be no travel restriction between member countries. This has produced a "xenophobia" with the prospect of masses of refugees in Western Europe leaving Eastern Europe and the Soviet Union.²⁰⁰ By November 1990, Finland had already witnessed a 25 percent increase in the issuance of tourist visas to Soviet citizens from the Leningrad and Kola regions over the previous year, and Denmark granted political asylum to 89 Soviet refugees in 1990, an marked increase from the 9 granted the year before.²⁰¹ Western European officials have already labeled the refugee problem as the "big issue of this decade" and that "a wave of several million migrants should be expected in the coming years."²⁰²

Scandinavian countries have taken a dim view of the force that the Soviet Union has used in the Baltics to repress independence movements. There have been repeated calls by several Nordic assemblies for the Soviets to forsake the use of force there and to allow the Baltic States to

²⁰⁰See Alan Riding, "West Europe Braces for Migrant Wave From East," New York Times, 14 December 1990, p. A6(W)

²⁰¹Julian Isherwood, "Finns Braced for Soviet Influx," Daily Telegraph, 22 October 1990, p. 11, as cited in FBIS-WEU-90-213-A, 2 November 1990, p. 19.

²⁰²Riding.

pursue their independence.²⁰³ Continued pressure on the Soviets by Norway and Sweden has caused diplomatic strains recently. President Gorbachev, speaking in Stockholm with Swedish Prime Minister Ingvar Carlsson stated that "[c]ompassion by a neighboring country must not take the form of meddling in the affairs of the Soviet Union, especially when it is in the process of reform. . . . To support separatism and oppress minorities is not acceptable"²⁰⁴ Carlsson appeared to reject Gorbachev's remarks, stating, ". . . Sweden had historical and cultural ties with the Baltic States."²⁰⁵

The Baltic issue is one which the United States has so far treated with care, trying to walk a diplomatic tightrope to avoid confrontation with the Soviets and upsetting the new found nature of trust and Gorbachev's reforms. This tactic might backfire with regard to European opinion.²⁰⁶

²⁰³William E. Schmidt, "Gorbachev, in Oslo, Links World Peace to Perestroika," New York Times, 6 June 1991, p. A6(W); and Interview with E.A. Shevardnadze conducted by Nutrias Kontakt correspondent: "E.A. Shevardnadze's Answers to Questions Posed by the Northern Council's Journal," Nutrias Kontakt," trans. JPRS-UIA-90-013-L, 26 December 1990, p. 6.

²⁰⁴Unattributed Associated Press article, "West Told not to Meddle in Baltics," Monterey Herald, 7 June 1991, pp. A1 and A14.

²⁰⁵Ibid.

V. CONCLUSION

Planning for the future security needs of the United States has never been more important than at this time. Unlike past periods, the post Cold War period lacks a vanquished opponent. The Soviet Union, although experiencing a multitude of internal problems, still possesses the largest military force in Europe and is the only nation capable of destroying the United States within a matter of hours. Third World threats, seeking to establish themselves as power brokers capable of altering the regional balance of power for their own designs, exist throughout the world. Additionally, the terrorist threat and the "war on drugs" will compete for U.S. naval assets in the coming decade. The naval planner must look for lessons learned from the successes of the past and apply them toward a future naval strategy as part of America's national strategy. More importantly, the planner must be aware of the threats to America's "vital interest."²⁰⁷

²⁰⁶See editorial, Flora Lewis, "The Next Soviet Challenge," New York Times, 6 February 1991, p. A19(W).

²⁰⁷Hartmann and Wendzel, p. 44; defines vital interest as "worth going to war or the serious risk of war." Gray,

At first glance there appears to be an attempt by the United States and its West European partners to develop a comprehensive and cohesive defense strategy. There are many potential pitfalls along the way however. The first and foremost question on any planner's mind should be the future of the Soviet Union. The supposition that it will become a responsible member of the world community and that Soviet military reductions mandated under CFE and START treaties, will be realized, are at the heart of Western defense planning. The West must maintain a close watch for a resurgent Soviet military and for changes on the political scene that would indicate a return to the days of the Cold War. This will place a major burden on Western intelligence agencies. The two year warning window is necessary for the "reconstitution" of Western forces. The West will need to maintain the industrial base required of this policy and the indications of its doing so are not heartening.²⁰⁸ This also places increased pressure on Western political leadership to recognize, accept and take action against increasing or resurgent threats.

p. 40; uses the term "survival interest" meaning nuclear deterrence, which he deems more important.

²⁰⁸See Tritten, Campbell, and Turner.

U.S. economic and trade interest is shifting. Already United States' trading with Pacific Rim countries exceeds that of Europe by 30 percent.²⁰⁹ This will inevitably result in a shift of regional interest for the U.S. The Persian Gulf will continue to be an area that will require America's attention for the foreseeable future. The countering interest between Europe and other regions will force tough decisions on planners in the next decade, especially as U.S. troop strength is brought down in Europe and Europe continues to push for more autonomy in its security affairs.

The "Lehman Maritime Strategy" may be "on the shelf," but the strategic importance of the Northern Flank region has not decreased. If anything, its importance has increased. As long as the Soviet Union possesses a sea-based nuclear capability homeported mainly in the Kola, the United States will have an interest in the region. The Norwegians, sharing a common border with the Soviets, also will share that interest, regardless of the tensions of the time. It behooves both the United States and Norway to maintain a close alliance for their mutual interest.

²⁰⁹Grassey, p. 32.

The naval requirements for future uncertainties will require a mobile, flexible force mix. To borrow from Captain Wayne Hughes: "The only certainty about our navy's wartime role is the uncertainty of predicting in peacetime what site, enemy and mission will be involved."²¹⁰

²¹⁰Wayne P. Hughes, Jr., Fleet Tactics: Theory and Practice (Annapolis, MD: Naval Institute Press, 1986), p. 33.

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